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ARTICLE
PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF CONTACT TRACING: AN
ANALYSIS OF CONTACT TRACING APPS IN
DIFFERENT STATUTORY AND DISEASE
FRAMEWORKS
CHRISTOPHER S. YOO* AND APRATIM VIDYARTHI†
The Covid-19 pandemic is a historic pandemic that has affected the lives
of virtually everyone on the globe. One approach to slowing the spread of the
disease is to use contact tracing, facilitated by our internet-connected
smartphones. Different nations and states have partnered to develop a variety
of contact tracing apps that use different technologies and architectures.
This paper investigates how five contact tracing apps—Germany’s
Corona-Warn-App, Israel’s HaMagen, North Dakota’s Care19 Diary and
Alert apps, and India’s Aarogya Setu—fare in privacy-oriented statutory
frameworks to understand the design choices and public health implications
shaped by these statutes. The three statutes—the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act, the California Consumer Privacy Act, and the
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation—provide different
incentives to app developers across eight categories of design choices: notice
and consent, consent requirements for medical data disclosed to third parties,
location identifying technologies, data profiles and data collection,
minimizing data categories collected, data sale and sharing with nonresearch third parties, third party and researcher access to data, and
affirmative user rights. Each framework balances incentives to app
developers with the need for governments to cater to pressing emergencies
like public health needs. Some of the incentives in each framework end up
favoring less privacy-protective design choices, whereas other provisions
make it harder for public health authorities to flexibly respond to crises.
Finally, this paper investigates how these frameworks would fare with
different disease variables, by applying the analysis above to three different
diseases that could require contact tracing: SARS, Ebola, and HIV. Our
*
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conclusion is that the disease variables themselves will affect whether the
balance tilts towards public health or privacy, and that the statutes give
varying levels of flexibility to cater to more pressing emergencies.
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INTRODUCTION
As of March 2021, the COVID-19 pandemic had claimed the lives of
more than two million people, and infected more than one hundred million,
making it a deadly, once-in-a-lifetime crisis.1 The novel, interconnected
nature of the contemporary global economy accelerated the transmission of
an already infectious disease and exacerbated attempts to contain the
contagion. Yet the expansive and advanced nature of the modern economy
also ubiquitously features smartphones, the Internet, and data collection,
which enhanced the effectiveness of an important tool for technologists and
public health agencies to slow the spread of the pandemic: digital contact
tracing.
The idea of contact tracing is not novel. Plague crosses, which were
placed on buildings occupied by the victims of plague, served as a
rudimentary mechanism for minimizing the risk of contagion in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.2 During the AIDS crisis in the 1980s,
public health officials debated the balance between contact tracing and
discrimination against the LGBTQ community.3 The trend continues in our
latest health crisis, with digital contact tracing apps using the mobility and
accessibility of Internet-connected smartphones to track and slow the spread
of COVID-19.
But this latest iteration of contact tracing also raises concerns about data
privacy inherent to all Internet-connected apps and devices. To fulfill their
purpose of tracing the spread of a disease, contact tracing apps necessarily
must collect some type of location and test result data and upload them to the
Internet. Both location and test result data can be considered intimate and
private, revealing the granular details of where users travel, with whom they
associate, and what potential locations might have caused them to test
positive. If an app is to collect such data, what design decisions help protect
against the misuse of this data and mitigate concerns of surveillance? Do
existing privacy regimes provide adequate guidance to guide developers as
they balance the importance of protecting privacy against the need to perform
critical public health functions through technology? Do such statutes provide
1

World Health Org., WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard, https://covid19.who.int/
(last visited Mar. 9, 2021). We use the March figures for consistency across the other figures
used in this paper.
2
See FRANK M. SNOWDEN, EPIDEMICS AND SOCIETY 77 (2019) (“Searchers then marked the
houses of plague victims with a cross daubed in red, sealed the premises, and posted a guard
outside to thwart any attempt to enter or exit the sick house.”). For a visual take, see MONTY
PYTHON AND THE HOLY GRAIL (Python (Monty) Pictures 1975).
3
NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF AIDS IN THE UNITED STATES 30-34 (Albert
R. Jonsen & Jeff Stryker eds., 1993).
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adequate flexibility in addressing the changing needs of particular public
health crises? And how do we balance the public health needs of preventing
the spread of a deadly disease against individuals’ privacy rights and
expectations?
In this paper, we attempt to answer these pressing questions by using
three leading privacy regimes—the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA), the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA),
and the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)—as
benchmarks for understanding what types of design choices they encourage
for the developers of contact tracing apps. We measure the performance of
five COVID-19 contact tracing apps from across the globe against the
standards across eight design categories set forth in these three regulatory
schemes. We then look at what these regimes cover and what they miss, and
how they would fare in public health crises with different disease variables.
In Part I, we describe the statutory regimes and the apps we assess:
Germany’s Corona-Warn-App, Israel’s HaMagen, North Dakota’s Care-19
Diary and Alert apps, and India’s Aarogya Setu app. In Part II, we look at
eight factors in the statutes that implicate design decisions of each of these
apps: notice and consent, consent requirements for disclosing medical data to
third parties, location identifying technologies, data profiles and data
collection, minimizing data categories collected, data sale and sharing with
non-research third parties, access to data for research, and affirmative user
rights. We assess how each of the apps measures up against the HIPAA,
CCPA, and GDPR benchmarks in each of these eight categories. In Part III,
we look at how disease variables affect some of these common factors
assessed and analyze whether the statutes provide adequate flexibility to
balance different public health concerns of three other diseases—SARS,
Ebola, and HIV—against privacy.
Ultimately, we conclude that the three privacy regimes encourage app
developers to make design choices that favor privacy while simultaneously
allowing these apps to succeed at contact tracing. The statutes also provide
some flexibility to accommodate public health concerns, often at the expense
of individual privacy, under appropriate circumstances. Nonetheless, there
are some aspects of privacy, like dignitary concerns, that are not captured by
these statutes and that require a more complex framework to address.
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BACKGROUND

A. Regimes Analyzed
We use three regulatory regimes from the U.S. and the EU as
representative approaches to privacy. The first is the implementation of the
privacy provisions of the federal Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA).4 The second is the California Consumer
Protection Act (CCPA), which governs privacy and data issues for firms
operating in, or interacting with, consumers in California. 5 The third is the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which governs uses of data in
the European Union. Taken together, these three regimes represent
significantly different approaches that help understand how privacy
regulations affect design decisions surrounding contact tracing apps. These
regimes’ different geographic and subject matter scope make it unlikely that
all three fully apply to any of the apps we are studying. Even if not directly
applicable, they provide useful benchmarks for assessing whether the apps
we are studying protect privacy and how privacy regulations affect design
decisions.

4

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 264,
110 Stat. 1936, 2033, reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 note; see also Dixie B. Baker, Jane
Kaye & Sharon F. Terry, Privacy, Fairness, and Respect for Individuals, 4 eGEMs 8 (2016),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4827784/pdf/egems1207.pdf
(“FIPPs
included in the HHS guidance . . . have been implemented in the HIPAA Privacy
Rule . . . .”).
5
In 2020, California passed California Proposition 24, known as the California Privacy
Rights Act (CPRA), which is an amendment to the CCPA. Cameron F. Kerry & Caitlin Chin,
By passing Proposition 24, California voters up the ante on federal privacy law, BROOKINGS
(Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2020/11/17/by-passingproposition-24-california-voters-up-the-ante-on-federal-privacy-law/#cancel. The CPRA
expands upon the scope of the CCPA, creating a privacy protection agency, governing both
the sale and sharing of data (the latter of which was not addressed by the CCPA), and further
limiting the use of sensitive personal information by businesses. See generally Cal. Sec’y
State, Proposition 24, https://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/propositions/24/ (last visited Mar. 11,
2021). This paper does not use the CPRA as a benchmark. First, the law passed after we
began writing this paper, and there is inadequate analysis about the legal, technological, and
business implications of the act. Second, the CCPA’s approach provides a better
juxtaposition to the GDPR’s. Finally, the CPRA’s provisions do not come into effect until
as far as 2023. See Cal. Sec’y State, Text of Proposed Law: Proposition 24, at 44, 70
https://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2020/general/pdf/topl-prop24.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2021)
(explaining how the act exempts some provisions for employee and business to business
communications until January 1, 2023, and enforcement shall not begin until July 1, 2023).

2021]

PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF CONTACT TRACING

107

1. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (HIPAA)
HIPAA called upon the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
develop national standards for privacy in electronic health care records. 6 The
standards applied the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) of notice,
choice, access, and security developed in 19737 and included in the Privacy
Act of 1974’s statement of purpose 8 to Protected Health Information (PHI).
One of the key design issues presented by HIPAA is whether the app or any
recipient of the PHI is a covered entity. Covered entities are defined as health
plans, healthcare clearinghouses, and healthcare providers that electronically
transmit health information, and the business associates of covered entities to
whom such information is sent.9 Large, multifunction institutions may limit
the application of HIPAA by declaring themselves to be hybrid entities and
by identifying which components are health care components subject to
HIPAA and which components are not.10 For covered entities and their
business associates, HIPAA’s privacy rules govern the disclosure of PHI in
treatment, payment, and operations.11 Notably, HIPAA does not restrict the
use or disclosure of PHI that has been properly deidentified, 12 such as by
removing eighteen types of identifiers including names, locations, dates,
device identifiers, and Internet Protocol addresses. 13
To provide guidance regarding the application of HIPAA during COVID19, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) released a notice
in February of 2020,14 which it followed up with a formal waiver exercising
the statutory authority to waive enforcement of five designated provisions to
provide greater flexibility in providing care to COVID-19 patients. 15 HHS’s

6

45 C.F.R. § 164 (1996).
Id.
8
Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(b), 88 Stat 1896, 1896, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 552a note.
9
45 C.F.R. § 160.102(a) (1996). Healthcare clearinghouses are public or private entities that
either process or facilitate the processing of health information; or does so by receiving
transactions from a third-party entity. Id. § 160.103.
10
Id. § 164.105(a).
11
Id. § 164.104.
12
Id. § 164.502(d).
13
Id. § 164.514(b)(2)(i).
14
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. Off. for Civ. Rts., Bulletin: HIPAA Privacy and Novel
Coronavirus (Feb. 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/february-2020-hipaa-andnovel-coronavirus.pdf.
15
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Waiver or Modification of Requirements Under
Section 1135 of the Social Security Act (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.phe.gov/
emergency/news/healthactions/section1135/Pages/covid19-13March20.aspx.
7
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Office of Civil Rights later issued administrative waivers governing
telehealth, business associates, and community-based testing sites. 16
2. California Consumer Protection Act (CCPA)
In 2018, California enacted the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)
to implement the California Constitution’s right of privacy. 17 The Act is
intended to give people the right to know what personal information is being
collected about them, to know to whom that personal information has been
sold or disclosed, to block the sale of their personal data, to access their
personal information, and not to be penalized for exercising their privacy
rights.18 Despite this breadth, the statute does not apply to aggregated or
deidentified information.19 The statute applies only to entities that meet
certain size thresholds and do business in California,20 though in practice
because many technology companies reside in California and because data
may flow through such companies, the Act has wide applicability across the
nation. Unlike HIPAA, CCPA does not provide for waivers during public
health emergencies, and the California Attorney General responded to
industry calls for delaying enforcement of the statute until January 2021 by
emphasizing the importance of adhering to the statute during the COVID-19
pandemic21 amid media reports that his office intended to begin enforcing it
on July 1, 2020.22

16

Notification of Enforcement Discretion for Telehealth Remote Communications During
the COVID-19 Nationwide Public Health Emergency, 85 Fed. Reg. 22,024 (Mar. 17, 2020)
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164); Enforcement Discretion Under HIPAA To Allow
Uses and Disclosures of Protected Health Information by Business Associates for Public
Health and Health Oversight Activities in Response to COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. 19,392 (Apr.
7, 2020) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164); Enforcement Discretion Regarding
COVID–19 Community-Based Testing Sites (CBTS) During the COVID–19 Nationwide
Public Health Emergency, 85 Fed. Reg. 29,637 (Apr. 9, 2020) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R.
pts. 160, 164).
17
California Consumer Privacy Act, ch. 55, 2018 Cal. Stat. 1809 (codified as amended at
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798 (2020)).
18
Id. § 1798.110.
19
Id. § 1798.145(a)(5).
20
Id. § 1798.140(d)(1) (2020).
21
Press Release, Off. Att’y Gen., State of Cal. Dep’t of Just., Attorney General Becerra
Reminds Consumers of their Data Privacy Rights During the COVID-19 Public Health
Emergency (Apr. 10, 2020), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-generalbecerra-reminds-consumers-their-data-privacy-rights-during.
22
See, e.g., Marty Swant, Citing COVID-19, Trade Groups Ask California’s Attorney
General To Delay Data Privacy Enforcement, FORBES (Mar. 19, 2020, 3:13 PM EDT),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/martyswant/2020/03/19/citing-covid-19-trade-groups-askcalifornias-attorney-general-to-delay-data-privacy-enforcement/?sh=227783085c30
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3. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
In 2016, the European Union adopted GDPR to govern data collection,
use, and sharing in the EU.23 GDPR applies where data are processed through
automated means and where structured sets of personal data are accessed by
entities within the EU, or by entities accessing the data of subjects located in
the EU.24 It thus necessarily covers any Internet-based application that
collects and processes data, including contact tracing apps. 25 However, not
all data are covered by the GDPR: pseudonymization is one of the
considerations that may authorize processing of personal data for a purpose
other than that for which the personal data was collected without consent. 26
The statute also authorizes states to enact legislation to collect location data
in ways that deviate from GDPR where necessary to safeguard public
security, so long as it is an appropriate and proportionate measure for a
democratic society and complies with applicable protections for fundamental
and human rights.27
Like HIPAA, the European Data Protection Board has issued guidelines
regarding the application of GDPR to location data and contact tracing apps. 28
The guidelines provide a synthesis of data collection and processing rules,
but indicate general adherence to the GDPR’s original clauses. They
emphasize data minimization, data protection, anonymization, and purpose
limitation.29 The guidelines also recommend the voluntary use of contact
tracing apps, rather policies that mandate the use of such apps, and
recommend the use of “proximity information” (such as Bluetooth, infra)
instead of the tracking of “individual movements.”30

(reporting the government’s intention to enforce the CCPA starting July 1 despite the
COVID-19 pandemic).
23
Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU) [hereinafter GDPR].
24
Id. arts. 2(1), 3, 4(2), (6).
25
Id. arts. 2(1), 4(2), (6).
26
Id. art. 6(4)(e).
27
Id. art. 23(1)(e); see also Statement on the processing of personal data in the context of the
COVID-19 outbreak, EUR. DATA PROT. BD § 1.3 (Mar. 19, 2020), https://edpb.europa.eu/
sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb_statement_2020_processingpersonaldataandcovid-19
_en.pdf (“Such exceptional legislation is only possible if it constitutes a necessary,
appropriate, and proportionate measure within a democratic society.”).
28
Guidelines 04/2020 on the use of location data and contact tracing tools in the context of
the COVID-19 outbreak, EUR. DATA PROT. BD. § 1 (Apr. 21, 2020),
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb_guidelines_20200420_contact_traci
ng_covid_with_annex_en.pdf.
29
Id. § 2.2.
30
Id. § 1(8).
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B. Applications Analyzed
We analyze five contact tracing apps against the three regulatory
frameworks to see how they shape the privacy-related design decisions for
these apps: Germany’s Corona-Warn-App, Israel’s HaMagen, North
Dakota’s Care19 Diary and Alert apps, and India’s Aarogya Setu. These apps
employ different geolocation technologies (Bluetooth versus Global
Positioning System(GPS)/Cell Site Location Information (CSLI) data); 31
collect different types of data and store them in different ways, employ
different application architectures, rely on different means to incorporate test
results, and enjoy different levels of adoption in their respective jurisdictions.

31

We note here that we use GPS and CSLI interchangeably. While there are differences as
to the underlying computational mechanisms, some of the app developers use these terms
interchangeably, and they implicate similar privacy concerns in comparison to Bluetooth.
See, e.g., Bhairav Acharya, Richa Goyal & Jaideep Reddy, Cell Phone Location Tracking,
BERKELEY LAW, https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2016-06-07_
Cell-Tracking-Primer_Final.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2021) (describing the differences
between the two methods, but then using the same legal analysis across both).
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Table 1: App Summary
CoronaWarn-App

HaMagen

Country

Germany

Israel

Technology

Bluetooth

Data Storage

Phone

GPS/CSLI +
Optional
Bluetooth
Phone/
upload to
government
servers with
consent

Care-19
Diary
U.S./North
Dakota

Care-19
Alert
U.S./North
Dakota

Aarogya
Setu

GPS/CSLI

Bluetooth

GPS/CSLI +
Bluetooth

Phone/
upload to
developers
with consent

Phone/
upload to
developers
with consent

Upload to
government
database

India

Data
Collected

Bluetooth

Location +
Bluetooth

Location

Bluetooth

Name, phone
number,
health details,
occupation,
location, and
Bluetooth

Developer

German
Government/
Robert Koch
Institute

Israeli
Government/
GlobeKeeper

North
Dakota/
ProudCrowd

North
Dakota/
ProudCrowd

Indian
Government

Outreach
before use by
state
government

Outreach
before use by
state
government

Opt-in

Opt-in

Self + cross
reference
with
government
database
Mandated

Unclear

Unclear

12%

Test
Reporting

QR
codes/labs

Policy

Opt-in

Cross
reference
with
government
database
Opt-in

Penetration

25%

17%

1. Germany: Corona-Warn-App
Germany’s Corona-Warn-App is a decentralized contact tracing app
developed by the Robert Koch Institute (RKI) in cooperation with the
German government. It uses Bluetooth and the Apple/Google Exposure
Notification System (ENS) to transmit random identification numbers that
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are changed every ten to twenty minutes to other phones using the app. 32 If
the app detects another user running the app within 1.5 meters of the current
user for at least ten minutes, it records the day, time, and duration of the
contact as well as the strength of the Bluetooth signal. 33 To report test results,
users can use a QR code they receive from the testing facility to upload their
test result to the app.34 Users who test positive can send to the competent
health authorities all of the pairwise location data over the preceding two
weeks, combined with their test results. The health authorities then pass the
information on to the transnational warning system.35 The transnational
warning system uses that information to generate lists of anonymous
identifiers associated with positive tests along with an assessment of
transmission risk and sends those lists to all app users. 36 The app then matches
the identifiers in the list of infected people with those to which it has been in
close proximity and calculates the risk that the user has been infected based
on the date of contact and the signal strength. 37 The app collects consent only
for usage of the app, for uploading their test results, and for the upload of
Bluetooth pairwise data if the user tests positive, meaning it does not collect
a broad data profile of the user.38 Usage of the app is voluntary.39 As of April
2021, the app had been downloaded 26.7 million times. 40
2. Israel: HaMagen
Israel’s HaMagen app is an open-source centralized contact tracing app
created by the Israeli government in collaboration with Tel Aviv-based
32

Frequently Asked Questions about the Corona-Warn-App, CORONA-WARN-APP OPEN
SOURCE PROJECT, https://www.coronawarn.app/en/faq/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2020)
[hereinafter Corona-Warn-App FAQs].
33
Id.
34
Privacy Notice, CORONA-WARN-APP OPEN SOURCE PROJECT § 6(b), https://www.corona
warn.app/assets/documents/cwa-privacy-notice-en.pdf (last amended Dec. 15, 2021)
[hereinafter Corona-Warn-App Privacy Notice].
35
Id. § 6(c).
36
Id. §§ 7, 10.
37
Id. § 6(a); Svea Windwehr & Jillian C. York, Germany’s Corona-Warn-App: Frequently
Asked Questions, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (June 17, 2020), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2020/06/germanys-corona-warn-app-frequently-asked-questions.
38
See Corona-Warn-App Privacy Notice, supra note 34, § 5(a) (“[The] access data is
processed to maintain and secure the technical operation of the app and the server system.
You will not be identified personally as a user of the app and no user profile will be
created.”).
39
See Windwehr & York, supra note 37.
40
Übersicht zu aktuellen und früherer Zahlen und Fakten zur Corona-Warn-App [Overview
of Current and Previous Facts and Figures About the Corona-Warn-App], ROBERT KOCH
INSTITUT,
https://www.rki.de/DE/Content/InfAZ/N/Neuartiges_Coronavirus/WarnApp/
Archiv_Kennzahlen/WarnApp_KennzahlenTab.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2021).
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GlobeKeeper. Instead of relying on the Google/Apple ENS, HaMagen uses
GPS, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth data to track users’ movements and store two
weeks of location information on their devices. 41 In addition, once an hour,
the app downloads an anonymized list of locations where the Ministry of
Health has verified that COVID-19 patients have visited. 42 The app then cross
references the users’ locations history against the list without their location
data ever leaving the device and notifies the user if they have been in close
proximity with someone who has tested positive for COVID-19. 43 The app
collects consent for usage of the app and for the collection of location and
Bluetooth data. Users identified as verified COVID-19 patients may agree to
have their location data transferred to the Ministry, where they will be
examined within the framework of the epidemiological investigation and
published without any identifying details, in order to alert the public about
locations where infected people have been. 44 Media reports from November
2020 report that the app had been downloaded 2.5 million times, although
technical problems and lack of confidence in the government’s response to
the pandemic caused usage to drop off substantially. 45 The terms of use
specify that users shall have no claims for privacy violations as a result of
using the app.46
3. North Dakota: Care19 Diary and Alert
The State of North Dakota, in conjunction with local tech company
ProudCrowd, has developed two apps to support COVID-19 contact tracing.
Care19 Diary helps users log their whereabouts, whereas Care19 Alert tracks
a user’s proximity to other users. 47 Originally deployed only in North Dakota,
it is now also available in South Dakota and Wyoming.

41

Privacy & Pandemics: The Role of Mobile Apps (Chart), FUTURE OF PRIV. F. (Apr. 2020),
https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Privacy-Pandemics-The-Role-of-Mobile-Apps.
pdf [hereinafter Privacy & Pandemics]; Privacy Policy and Information Security, MINISTRY
OF HEALTH § 2 (Mar. 21, 2020), https://govextra.gov.il/ministry-of-health/hamagenapp/magen-privacy-en/ [hereinafter HaMagen Privacy Policy].
42
HaMagen Privacy Policy, supra note 41, § 2.
43
Id. §§ 2-4.
44
Id. § 8.
45
Josh Mitnick, How Israel’s COVID contract tracing app rollout went wildly astray, CIO
(Nov. 2, 2020, 6:00 PM PST), https://www.cio.com/article/3591570/how-israels-hamagencontact-tracing-app-rollout-went-wildly-astray.html.
46
Terms of Use, HAMAGEN (July 27, 2020, 10:29 AM), https://govextra.gov.il/ministry-ofhealth/hamagen-app/terms-and-conditions-of-use-en/ [hereinafter HaMagen Terms of Use].
47
Care19, N.D. STATE GOV’T, https://ndresponse.gov/covid-19-resources/care19 (last
visited Nov. 14, 2020) [hereinafter Care19 Webpage].
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The Care19 Diary app is a location logger that uses GPS-based
technology developed by Apple and Google48 to track and store two weeks
of information49 about locations that the user has visited for ten or more
minutes.50 The location data are stored anonymously on servers maintained
by ProudCrowd and may be accessed temporarily by third parties for specific
processing tasks, but is otherwise accessible only by the user. 51 For example,
the app used to share data with Foursquare to convert longitude and latitude
data into recognizable place names.52 The app may also use the data to
calculate a personal risk score and to create a map of app users’ locations that
will be shared only on an aggregated basis.53 The state’s Department of
Health asks users who test positive for COVID-19 for consent to provide their
location information to the Department using a random identifier so that the
state government can contact trace and forecast the movement of the virus. 54
No profile is needed to use the app’s services, though consent is required for
data logging.55 Usage of the app is voluntary. It has been criticized for
inaccuracy56 and for initially sharing individual codes and failing to disclose
the sharing of personal identifiers with third parties. 57
The Care19 Alert app is an exposure notification app launched in August
2020 based on the Google/Apple ENS. 58 It uses Bluetooth to check whether
a user is near any other users every fifteen minutes using the ENS, and stores
that information for up to two weeks, identified only through random
tokens.59 App users who test positive for COVID-19 have the option of
pushing the “Notify Others” button, which transmits the pairs of keys that
48

Burgum: ND to launch second contract tracing app using technology developed by Apple
and Google, N.D (May 20, 2020, 6:39 PM), https://www.health.nd.gov/news/burgum-ndlaunch-second-contact-tracing-app-using-technology-developed-apple-and-google.
49
Privacy Policy – Care19 Diary, CARE19, https://care19.app/diary/privacy (last visited
Nov. 24, 2020) [hereinafter Care19 Diary Privacy Policy].
50
Care19 Webpage, supra note 47.
51
Care19 Diary Privacy Policy, supra note 49.
52
Id.; Geoffrey A. Fowler, One of the first contact-tracing apps violates its own privacy
policy, WASH. POST (May 21, 2020) https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/
05/21/care19-dakota-privacy-coronavirus/.
53
Care19 Diary Privacy Policy, supra note 49.
54
Id.
55
Care19 Diary Application, GOOGLE PLAY STORE, https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=com.proudcrowd.care&hl=en_US&gl=US (last visited Nov. 14, 2020)
[hereinafter Care19 Diary App].
56
Jack Morse, North Dakota launched a contact-tracing app. It's not going well., MASHABLE
(May 26, 2020), https://mashable.com/article/north-dakota-contact-tracing-app/.
57
Fowler, supra note 52.
58
Care19 Webpage, supra note 47.
59
See Privacy, CARE19, https://www.care19.app/alert/privacy (last visited Apr. 3, 2021)
[hereinafter Care19 Alert Privacy Policy].
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have been close proximity to one another to the National Key Server operated
by the Association of Public Health Laboratories. 60 The National Key Server
periodically pushes out lists of the keys associated with people with positive
test results so that the app can determine whether a user is likely to have been
exposed.61 No profile is needed to use app services, though consent is
required for data logging.62 Data are stored on the app.63 The app does share
usage data needed for diagnostics with tools created by Google Firebase and
Bugfender.64 The Department regularly reports aggregate number of
exposures and users.65 Usage of the app is voluntary.
4. India: Aarogya Setu
India’s Aarogya Setu is an open-source66 app developed by the Indian
Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology.67 To register for the
app, users must create an account and provide their phone number, age,
gender, profession, travel history, and whether the user is a smoker, which is
saved on a government server using a unique digital identifier (DiD). 68 The
government uses this information to create anonymized, aggregated datasets
for COVID-19 management to communicate to users the probability that they
60

Id.; Care19 Alert Application, GOOGLE PLAY STORE, https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=com.proudcrowd.exposure&hl=en_US&gl=US (last visited Nov. 14, 2020)
[hereinafter Care19 Alert App]; North Dakota announces launch of Care19 Alert app to help
reduce spread of COVID-19 as students return, N.D. (Aug. 13, 2020, 12:55 PM),
https://www.health.nd.gov/news/north-dakota-announces-launch-care19-alert-app-helpreduce-spread-covid-19-students-return.
61
Care19 Alert App, supra note 60; Care19 Alert Privacy Policy, supra note 59; Care19
Webpage, supra note 47.
62
Care19 Alert App, supra note 60; Care19 Alert Privacy Policy, supra note 59.
63
Care19 Alert App, supra note 60; Care19 Alert Privacy Policy, supra note 59.
64
Care19 Alert Privacy Policy, supra note 59.
65
Id.
66
See, e.g., Ishan Patra, Aarogya Setu app is now open source: what does it mean?, THE
HINDU (May 27, 2020), https://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/technology/aarogya-setu-appis-now-open-source-what-does-it-mean/article31689459.ece (noting that the app has finally
become open source). But see Four months on, Aarogya Setu is still not open-source. WHY
and WHEN is what the nation really wants to know!, INTERNET FREEDOM FOUND. (Aug. 19,
2020), https://internetfreedom.in/aarogya-setu-should-be-open-source-now/ (noting that
source code releases are slow, source code releases do not match the actual app, and such
releases are missing server-side code and cloud deployment functions).
67
Andrew Clarance, Aarogya Setu: Why India’s Covid-19 contact tracing app is
controversial, BBC (May 14, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india52659520.
68
Aarogya Setu Application, AAROGYA SETU, https://aarogyasetu.gov.in/ (last visited Nov.
14, 2020) (see sign up pane on app) [hereinafter Aarogya Setu App]; Privacy Policy, § 1(a),
SWAREKSHA.GOV, https://web.swaraksha.gov.in/ncv19/privacy/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2020)
[hereinafter Aarogya Setu Privacy Policy].
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may have been infected with COVID-19, and to provide medical personnel
information needed to carry out interventions.69 The app uses both Bluetooth
and GPS data to exchange identifiers and to record the time and location when
an individual is within range of another app user, storing this information on
the user’s device.70 The app also collects and locally stores users’ location
data every fifteen minutes.71 The app gives users the option of taking selfassessment tests that ask about symptoms, underlying conditions, recent
travel, and conduct likely to have resulted in exposure, 72 storing that
information with the user’s location data.73 If a user tests positive or has a
self-assessment test that indicates possible infection, the app will upload their
location and proximity data to the server. 74 The government uses that data to
identify areas where outbreaks are likely to occur and are likely to need more
testing and treatment resources. 75 The government also notifies other users
with whom the person who has tested positive has come into close contact. 76
Downloading the app is mandatory for citizens living in COVID-19
containment zones as well as for all working employees in both the private
and public sectors.77 As of November 14, 2020, the app was being used by
more than 162 million users.78 Although the source code was not initially
available and the terms of service initially penalized reverse engineering and
disclaimed all liability, the government has attempted to address those
concerns.79

II.

ASSESSMENT OF PRIVACY AND DESIGN FACTORS

We look at eight common factors across HIPAA, CCPA, and GDPR that
influence the design of our five apps: notice and consent, consent for medical
69

Aarogya Setu Privacy Policy, supra note 68, § 2(a).
Id. § 1(b).
71
Id. § 1(d).
72
Aarogya Setu App: Follow these simple steps to do a self-assessment, INDIA TODAY (May
2, 2020, 15:41 IST), https://www.indiatoday.in/information/story/aarogya-setu-app-followthese-simple-steps-to-do-a-self-assessment-test-1673656-2020-05-02.
73
Aarogya Setu Privacy Policy, supra note 68, §§ 1(a)-(b), 2(d).
74
Id. § 1(d).
75
Id.
76
Terms of Service, AAROGYA SETU (Nov. 12, 2020, 12:33 PM), https://www.aarogyasetu.
gov.in/terms-conditions/.
77
Clarence, supra note 67.
78
Aarogya Setu App, supra note 68.
79
See Arshad R. Zargar, Privacy, security concerns as India forces virus-tracing app on
millions, CBS NEWS (May 27, 2020, 5:32 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
coronavirus-india-contact-tracing-app-privacy-data-security-concerns-aarogya-setu-forcedon-millions/ (on source code); Our analysis of Aarogya Setu’s Updated Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service, SFLC.IN (May 26, 2020, 13:52), https://sflc.in/our-analysis-aarogya-setusupdated-privacy-policy-and-terms-service (on reverse engineering and liability).
70
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data, location identifying technologies, data profiling and collection,
minimization of data categories collected, data sale and sharing with nonresearch third parties, access to data for research, and affirmative user rights.
A. Notice and Consent
Notice and consent is a bedrock principle of privacy that informs data
subjects about the kind of data the app would like to collect and asks them
for consent to collect that data. A privacy notice is a document or language
that defines how an organization, software, or application collects, processes,
and transmits user data, and what data protection principles are applied. 80
Consent requires providing consumers with adequate information and the
choice to agree to have their data be used in a specified manner, or otherwise
not use the service or application.81
As an initial matter, HIPAA applies only to covered entities, which do
not include apps and which data repositories can easily avoid being
categorized as by complying with requirements to constitute a hybrid entity.
Where HIPAA applies, it generally requires health providers or businesses
performing certain functions on their behalf to obtain user consent before
disclosing PHI to third parties. 82 HIPAA’s consent requirement thus applies
to disclosure of PHI shared by health providers but not to self-reported PHI
(which is created on the app and not by the health provider). If a contact
tracing app requires validation from a health provider, then HIPAA requires
user consent before the app shares any PHI. 83
In contrast to HIPAA’s focus on PHI, the CCPA’s consent requirements
govern the collection of a broad range of personal information and not just
health-related data.84 CCPA requires apps to provide notice at or before the
point of data collection.85 The notice must include the purposes for which the
information is being collected.86 Relatedly, for-profit businesses must
disclose the use, collection, and disclosure of personal information or
80

See, e.g., Writing a GDPR-compliant privacy notice, GDPR, https://gdpr.eu/privacynotice/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2020) (defining privacy notices); FED. TRADE COMM’N,
PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7 (June 1998), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/reports/privacy-online-report-congress/priv-23a.pdf (specifying factors that
are necessary to satisfy adequate notice).
81
Id. at 9.
82
45 C.F.R. § 164.508 (2013).
83
Laura Bradford, Mateo Aboy, & Kathleen Liddell, COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps: A
Stress Test for Privacy, the GDPR, and Data Protection Regimes, 7 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1,
9 (2020).
84
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.135 (2020).
85
Id. § 1798.135.
86
Id. § 1798.100(b).
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personally identifiable information (PII). 87 IP addresses and location data are
considered types of covered personal information 88 and thus are subject to
the disclosure requirements. For contact tracing apps, this means that users
must provide one-time consent for the app to collect geolocation data and IP
addresses.
GDPR’s consent requirements are stronger than CCPA’s. Every
controller—the entity that determines the purposes and means of processing
personal data89—must have a lawful basis for processing of personal data. 90
In the case of contact tracing, this is most likely through user consent, though
where carrying out a task is necessary for the public interest or in the exercise
of official authority, no such consent is needed.91 Consent must be for
processing of personal data that is “necessary for the performance of that
contract,”92 and consent must be explicit, informed, and presented to the user
in clear language.93 The consent notice must provide information about the
categories of personal data being processed, the purposes of processing, and
the existence of data subjects’ rights.94 Users must also be allowed to
withdraw their consent in a manner as easy as the mechanism for giving
consent.95 Finally, if consent is given to a public authority, that consent is not
considered freely given.96
The German Corona-Warn-App easily fulfills the notice and consent
standards of all three regimes. As a preliminary matter, because the German
App is not a health plan, health care clearinghouse, or a health care provider,
it is not a covered entity and is thus not subject to HIPAA. If the German
authorities receiving the data perform any functions that render them a
covered entity, they can avoid HIPAA’s coverage by making the declarations
needed to become a hybrid entity. If HIPAA were to apply, it would govern
the sharing of certain PHI, including COVID test results, risk levels, and
information about the onset of symptoms.97 The fact that the app obtains
consent before performing these functions and stores the data in an
87

Id. §§ 1798.100(b), 1798.140(c).
Id. § 1798.140(o)(1)(A).
89
GDPR, supra note 23, art. 4(7).
90
Id. art. 6(1)(a), (e).
91
Guidelines 03/2020 on the processing of data concerning health for the purpose of
scientific research in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak, EUR. DATA PROT. BD. § 4 (Apr.
21, 2020), https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb_guidelines_202003_
healthdatascientificresearchcovid19_en.pdf.
92
GDPR, supra note 23, art. 7(4).
93
Id. art. 7(1)-(2).
94
Id. art. 13(1).
95
Id. arts. 7(4) & 13(2)(c).
96
Id. recital 43.
97
Corona-Warn-App Privacy Notice, supra note 34, §§ 5(e), 6(b).
88
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aggregated and anonymous manner satisfies the HIPAA standard. 98 The app
also satisfies the CCPA benchmark of requiring consent when personal
information is initially collected: the app requests consent for the use of the
exposure notification framework, which allows the app to communicate
between smartphones;99 the app also requests consent for data collection and
provides information on the necessity for collecting the date, duration, and
signal strength when the user turns on exposure notification.100 Finally, the
app also satisfies the GDPR benchmark, since it requests consent for data
processing and for data transfer.101 The consent is explicit and provides
information about the categories of data being processed, the purposes of
processing, and user rights. This information is explicitly detailed in the
privacy notice.102 Additionally, the information collected is minimal (access
data, exposure data, and health data), satisfying the “necessity” requirements.
Finally, the app allows for the withdrawal of consent within the app,
satisfying the need for a withdrawal option.103
The Israeli HaMagen app satisfies the level of consent required CCPA
but may not satisfy that of GDPR. HaMagen is not subject to the HIPAA
benchmark because it collects location data, not medical data, and stores the
data locally without sharing them.104 HaMagen also fulfills the CCPA
benchmark because it requests consent to collect location data when signing
up for the app.105 On the consent screen, the app provides a document laying
out the app’s terms of use.106 However, where the German app has multiple
98

See Windwehr & York, supra note 37, at 2-3 (“[W]hen a person tests positive . . . the app
will send all of the daily keys it has used during the past 14 days to a server after the infected
user has given its consent to share that data.”). Note that the app also requires consent when
uploading the QR code that enables the sharing of a test result, which would satisfy HIPAA
consent requirements at both the collection and upload stages.
99
Corona-Warn-App Privacy Notice, supra note 34, § 2 (“All of the app’s main features that
require the transfer of your personal exposure or health data . . . will obtain your express
consent in advance.”).
100
Potentially confusing prompts when enabling Exposure Notifications, GITHUB,
https://github.com/corona-warn-app/cwa-backlog/issues/17 (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
101
See Corona-Warn-App Privacy Notice, supra note 34, § 3 (“[T]he [Robert Koch Institute]
will only process your data [for the purposes of exposure logging and warning others] if you
have given your express consent . . . .”) (alteration in original).
102
See id. §§ 5-13 (“What data is processed?”).
103
See id. § 12. (“How can you withdraw your consent?”).
104
See HaMagen Privacy Policy, supra note 41 and accompanying text (explaining the
HaMagen app collects location data, which is stored on the user device).
105
HaMagen 2.0 App, MINISTRY OF HEALTH, https://govextra.gov.il/ministry-ofhealth/hamagen-app/download-en/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2020) (see consent screen after app
installation) [hereinafter HaMagen App]. Note that the app also requests motion data for the
supplemental functionality of collecting driving data, so that it does not conflate time spent
in a vehicle with exposure in a public setting.
106
Id.

120

JOURNAL OF LAW & INNOVATION

[Vol. 4:1

consent requests, HaMagen requests blanket consent through a singular
request screen. The failure to obtain consent for each different type of
processing and transfer likely violates GDPR. The terms of use available on
the Ministry of Health’s website provide information about the categories of
data being processed, the purposes of processing, and user rights in the
privacy notice,107 and the posted privacy policy indicates that the Ministry
will request consent to share location information if the user tests positive.108
But neither meets the GDPR standard of consent because the app does not
lay these terms out clearly prior to asking for consent. Additionally, the app
does not provide a mechanism for users to withdraw their consent, though
location data consent can be turned off from the phone’s settings. Finally, it
is unclear whether consent given to the app is consent given to a public
authority (which would not be considered freely given),109 since the app’s
servers are owned and operated by the Ministry of Health.
Like the Israeli app, the North Dakota Care19 Diary and Alert apps likely
provide the level of consent mandated by CCPA but may not comply with
the requirements of GDPR. Similar to HaMagen, both Care19 apps do not
collect health data, which exempts them from any HIPAA requirements.
Specifically, since officials at the Department of Health are reaching out to
those who test positive for them to consent to sharing their location, no PHI
flows through the app.110 Both apps also easily satisfy the CCPA benchmarks.
Consent is required for collecting location data in the Diary app,111 and
consent is required for the Alert app to use Bluetooth for exposure
notification.112 Both apps describe in adequate detail the need for collecting
their respective data, fulfilling the CCPA requirements. Both apps also likely
satisfy key aspects of the GDPR benchmark for consent, since both request
consent for data collection; this consent is explicit and provides information
about data collected.113 The apps also request consent for data transfer: if a
user tests positive and the public health official calls and verifies the code on
the app that allows the app to show a positive test result, then the user can
107

See HaMagen Terms of Use, supra note 46 (describing how the HaMagen App collects
data location, stores it on the user’s device, and when it is released to the Ministry of Health
for contract tracing).
108
HaMagen Privacy Policy, supra note 41, § 8.3.
109
See Privacy & Pandemics, supra note 41 (“[U]sers who are diagnosed as Corona patients
(or their legal guardians) may allow for their information to be transferred to the Ministry of
Health (including its employees, representatives and service providers).”).
110
See Care19 Diary Privacy Policy, supra note 54 (“Your data is identified by an
anonymous code. If you test positive for Covid-19, health officials may ask if you will
consent to sharing this code.”).
111
Care19 Diary App, supra note 55.
112
Care19 Alert App, supra note 60.
113
Care19 Diary Privacy Policy, supra note 49; Care19 Alert Privacy Policy, supra note 59.
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notify others using the “Share Locations” button on the Diary app 114 and the
“Notify Others” button on the Alert app.115 However, the level of detail in the
privacy policies of either app is not as explicit or clear as those in the German
app, leaving the possibility that a regulator may find they do not satisfy the
GDPR benchmark. In addition, the app does not have an explicit option for
the withdrawal of consent, though location data consent can be turned off
from the phone’s settings, making the satisfaction of the GDPR benchmark
further questionable.
Finally, the Indian Aarogya Setu app fares the worst of the five apps,
possibly failing the CCPA consent standard and almost certainly failing to
satisfy the level of consent required by GDPR. Like HaMagen and the North
Dakota apps, the Indian app does not require the uploading of health data,
instead relying on self-reporting, which takes it outside the scope of privacy
protections mandated by HIPAA. Whether Aarogya Setu satisfies the CCPA
benchmark is less clear. The app does request consent to collect location data
when signing up for the app, explains the reasons for collecting location and
Bluetooth data, and provides the terms of use.116 However, the app does not
provide an explanation for why it requests the demographic (age, sex,
profession) and prior health data (such as whether the individual is a
smoker).117 Similarly, the app is even less likely to satisfy the GDPR
benchmark, since it is unclear whether collection of demographic data is
“necessary” for exposure notification. The privacy policy and consent screens
also may not provide enough information for the consent to sharing this data
to be considered “informed,” and the purposes of processing this data remain
unclear as well. Additionally, the app does not request consent for data
transfer, though location data are uploaded to a server only if the user has
self-reported as testing positive.118 Although self-reporting a positive test
may constitute implicit consent to transfer the data, GDPR requires explicit
consent.119 Finally, like the Israeli app, there is no option to withdraw
consent, but consent can be withdrawn through the phone’s settings,
implicitly allowing for withdrawal rights. And similar to HaMagen, it is
unlikely that consent is freely given, since the app and centralized servers are
114

Care19 Diary App, supra note 55 (Notify tab).
Care19 Alert App, supra note 60 (Protect tab).
116
Aarogya Setu App, supra note 68.
117
Aarogya Setu Privacy Policy, supra note 68, § 1(a).
118
Id.
119
Note that GDPR does not always require explicit consent. It permits processing necessary
for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is a party. GDPR, supra note 23,
art. 6(1)(b). Downloading the app could be considered a contract where the user agrees to
provide data in exchange for being given outbreak/health alerts, though such a theory is
untested in courts. If the theory holds, then data processing could be considered necessary to
perform the contract, making it legal even without consent.
115

JOURNAL OF LAW & INNOVATION

122

[Vol. 4:1

operated by the government. More importantly, downloading the app is
mandatory for those currently employed and working, further calling into
question how free the consent actually is.120
These three regimes affect design choices in different ways, as seen with
how each of the apps fare in this category. HIPAA’s exclusive focus on
medical data exempts apps that rely on self-reporting positive tests, which is
less reliable, creating a trade-off between more accurate contact tracing and
greater protection of privacy. In contrast, CCPA’s consent requirements are
widely applicable but easy to satisfy with a request for blanket consent when
downloading and setting up the app. GDPR’s standards pose the most
difficult design choices: requiring that the collection of data be “necessary”
narrows the categories of data that can be collected by a contact tracing app,
and thus limits the ability for developers to gather data unrelated to contact
tracing. But because GDPR requires unbundled consent, apps may have
multiple consent requests, either discouraging the user from using the app or
forcing them to provide consent without adequately considering whether they
care about the privacy implications of such consent. Finally, GDPR’s
requirement of withdrawal of consent introduces a design element that would
likely not otherwise be included.
Table 2: Notice and Consent Summary
Key: Green = Pass; Yellow = Unclear; Red = Fail; Gray = N/A
HIPAA

CCPA

GDPR

Corona-WarnApp
HaMagen
Care-19 Diary
Care-19 Alert
Aarogya Setu
B. Consent Requirements for Health Data Disclosed to Third Parties
Health data are intimately linked to a person’s bodily privacy and has
historically been accorded a higher level of privacy protection than other
types of data.121 HIPAA, CCPA, and GDPR all accord high consent
120

Clarance, supra note 67.
See, e.g., DeMay v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146, 149 (Mich. 1881) (addressing the breach of
privacy when a non-medical personnel witnessed a married and pregnant woman go into
labor).
121
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requirements regarding the disclosure of medical data to third parties, which
necessarily has an impact on contact tracing apps for COVID-19 (and other
diseases). For the purposes of this section’s analysis, we operate on the
theoretical assumption that each of the apps interfaces in some fashion with
health data, even though in practice only the German app directly interfaces
with medical data.
When it comes to PHI “collected by a covered entity or business associate
governed by the privacy, security, and breach notification rules issued by the
United States Department of Health and Human Services,” CCPA defers to
HIPAA.122 Where HIPAA applies, its consent requirements for the sharing
of medical data are strong: PHI collected by health providers or businesses
performing certain functions on their behalf cannot be disclosed to third
parties without consent of the data subject. 123 Thus, test results shared by
health providers are subject to protection (e.g. consent), while self-reported
data are not, since the latter is not data collected by health providers or their
business associates. If a contact tracing app requires validation from a health
provider, the HIPAA benchmark applies. 124
GDPR requires explicit consent for the processing of health data,125
defined as “personal data concerning health [including] all data pertaining to
the health status of a data subject which reveal information relating to the
past, current or future physical or mental health status of the data subject.” 126
Special protections apply if the user has not provided explicit consent to
health data being used for specified purposes unless processing is necessary
or required to protect the “vital interests” of the data subject or unless
processing is necessary for preventative or occupational medicine or in the
“areas of public health, such as protecting against serious cross-border threats
to health.”127 Positive diagnoses of COVID-19 are likely to fall under
“sensitive data concerning health” (i.e. data that reveals information about an
individual’s health status), triggering extra protections. 128
The German app complies with all three privacy regimes. It can easily
avoid HIPAA’s restrictions by ensuring that all entities connected with it are
either noncovered entities or hybrid entities. If HIPAA were to apply, the
German app does share certain PHI, including COVID test results, risk levels,
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CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.145(c) (2020).
45 C.F.R. § 164.508 (2013).
124
Bradford et al., supra note 83, at 9.
125
GDPR, supra note 23, art. 9(1)-(2)(a).
126
Id. art. 4(15); id. recital 35.
127
Id. art. 9(1), (2)(c), (h), (i).
128
Id. art. 4.
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and information about the onset of symptoms. 129 Since the app obtains
consent to collect proximity data and stores them data in an aggregated and
anonymous manner, it satisfies the HIPAA standard.130 The app also satisfies
the GDPR standard because it requests consent, both in the app, and from the
user when they get a test at a lab.131 And even if explicit consent is not
provided, the exceptions for public health would likely obviate the need for
consent.
The Israeli app also appears to comply with all three privacy regimes.
Although the Ministry of Health receives information about test results from
laboratories and epidemiological investigations, declaring itself to be a hybrid
entity would exempt it from HIPAA’s requirements. Moreover, the fact that
the lists of locations where verified coronavirus patients have visited are
aggregated and anonymized means that they are not PHI. Verified patients
may be asked to share the location data stored in the app with the Ministry,
with the consent being sufficient to satisfy HIPAA and thus also CCPA. In
contrast to this extensive analysis, we know that the app’s functions fall into
the public health exemption for GDPR, making it compliant.
Unlike the extensive HIPAA/CCPA analysis required for the Israeli app,
both North Dakotan apps specifically request consent through the
Department of Health. This specific consent fulfills the consent requirements
required by HIPAA even if the Department of Health is not a covered entity.
Further, as discussed above, because the consent requested by the Care19
apps complies the GDPR benchmark, they do not need the public health
exemptions. In either case, the exemptions would lead to the GDPR
benchmark being satisfied.
Finally, the Indian app presents a close case regarding HIPAA/CCPA
compliance, because, like the Israeli app, it cross-references Bluetooth and
GPS data with the location of users who tested positive. Because it is unclear
whether the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR), which hosts the
database of test results, would be considered a covered entity, it is unclear
whether the app satisfies the HIPAA/CCPA standard. ICMR coordinates
biomedical research, but its mandate also includes coordinating and
implementing medical research.132 Additionally, ICMR is associated with a
129

Corona-Warn-App Privacy Notice, supra note 34, §§ 5(e), 6(b).
See Windwehr & York, supra note 37 (“[W]hen a person tests positive . . . the app will
send all of the daily keys that it has used during the past 14 days to a server after the infected
user has given its consent to share that data.”).
131
The lab asks the user to consent to that data being shared when the user takes the test.
Corona-Warn-App Privacy Notice, supra note 34, §§ 5(e), 6(b).
132
Mandate, INDIAN COUNCIL OF MED. RSCH., https://icmr.org.in/about-us/abouticmr/mandate (last visited Jan. 22, 2021).
130

2021]

PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF CONTACT TRACING

125

lab network and sample testing, indicating that the organization may also be
conducting testing, which would make it a covered entity. 133 If ICMR has inhouse tests that are added to the database which cross references positive tests
with user location data, then ICMR’s role subjects it to the HIPAA standard.
It is unclear whether the tests themselves ask for user consent, like in the
German case. Further, the app does not ask for consent for sharing positive
test results, leading to further uncertainty about whether the app satisfies the
HIPAA/CCPA standard. In contrast to this extensive analysis, the app’s
function would subject it to the public health exemption for GDPR, satisfying
that benchmark.
In the context of consent for medical data, these analyses indicate the
diverging incentives and implications of the HIPAA/CCPA and GDPR
approaches. Whether a contract tracing app must comply with HIPAA
depends on whether it constitutes a covered entity, which is an inquiry
heavily influenced by legal definitions that can create rigidity that can slow
app development during public health crises like COVID-19. Further,
HIPAA’s specific consent requirements are relatively stringent; when
centralized data provided by a government agency that also administers tests
are cross-referenced with user data, that creates complexity that indicates the
need for specific consent. This may create a disincentive to have such a
centralized system. In contrast, GDPR’s exemptions for public health make
it more flexible, despite its generally stricter approach to privacy regulation.
Table 3: Consent for Medical Data Summary
Key: Green = Pass; Yellow = Unclear; Red = Fail; Gray = N/A
HIPAA/CCPA

GDPR

Corona-Warn-App
HaMagen
Care-19 Diary
Care-19 Alert
Aarogya Setu
C. Location-Identifying Technologies
Contract tracing apps employ two different approaches to tracking
location. One approach uses technologies such as CSLI and GPS to track the
app’s absolute location, using either information about the nearest cell tower
133

ICMR Rapid Response Team for COVID-19, INDIAN COUNCIL OF MED. RES.,
https://covid.icmr.org.in/rapid-response-team (last visited Jan. 22, 2021).
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(CSLI) or geolocation information derived from satellites (GPS). 134 Another
approach uses technologies such as Bluetooth to track an app’s proximity to
other devices that have Bluetooth enabled and are running the same app.135
Thus, the former approach collects absolute location data, whereas the latter,
proximity-oriented approach instead collects data about location relative to
other users, rather than absolute location.
The privacy regimes under consideration take different approaches to the
collection of location data. As noted above, apps and data repositories may
avoid being subject to HIPAA by avoiding the activities that would bring
them with in the definition of covered entity or by being designated a hybrid
entity. Where HIPAA applies, it treats device identifiers, serial numbers, and
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses used in connection with health information
as identifiers that must be removed in order to make the data deidentified. 136
However, in this context the GPS/CSLI and Bluetooth data are not being used
by health providers in association with medical data and are instead being
collated through separate sources that prevent such information from being
considered PHI.137 Thus, this section will focus on the CCPA and GDPR’s
provisions regarding GPS/CSLI and Bluetooth data.
CCPA treats IP addresses and location data as types of covered personal
information.138 Thus, the collection of this information requires notice and
consent.139 CCPA does not apply to deidentified information, but it does
prohibit re-identification of deidentified information.140 Bluetooth signals
could count as de-identified information under CCPA, since such signals fit
within the category of information that can “reasonably identify, relate to,
describe, be capable of being associated with, or be linked . . . to a particular
consumer . . . .”141 However, how contact tracing apps use Bluetooth
indicates that it is possible for Bluetooth data to remain deidentified and

134

On the similarities and differences between location tracking using CSLI and GPS, see
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216-19 (2018).
135
See, e.g., Douglas J. Leith & Stephen Farrell, Coronavirus Contact Tracing: Evaluating
the Potential of Using Bluetooth Received Signal Strength for Proximity Detection, TRINITY
COLL. DUBLIN (May 6, 2020), https://www.scss.tcd.ie/Doug.Leith/pubs/bluetooth_rssi_
study.pdf (describing Bluetooth contact tracing as measuring proximity between two users;
this contrasts with GPS/CSLI, which look for absolute and not relative location data).
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45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(M)-(O), (e)(2)(xii)-(xiv) (2013).
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See Bradford et al., supra note 83, at 9 n.47 (describing a possible workaround where
covered entities can hire companies like Google or Apple to provide Bluetooth handshake
data).
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Id. § 1798.135(o)(1)(G).120(b).
140
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escape CCPA scrutiny, whereas location data are always subject to CCPA
regulations.
Similarly, GDPR considers location data to be PII, subjecting such data
to GDPR protections and principles of lawfulness and consent, limited
processing, accuracy, security, and deletion. 142 IP addresses may be
considered “personal data” in some circumstances. 143 This is true even if the
location data are encrypted, since the information is still “information in
relation to an ‘identifiable’ natural person.”144 In Breyer v. Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that even
when information such as a dynamic Internet Protocol (IP) address 145 does
not provide directly identifiable information about a data subject, if the
dynamic IP address was used in combination with data held by a person’s
Internet Service Provider (ISP), then the dynamic IP address would be
considered PII.146 The court implicitly adopted a relativity test: if a piece of
information does not identify a data subject directly but in the hands of a third
party could be used to identify a data subject if combined with other data that
the third party possesses, then in the hands of that third party, that information
is PII.147 Thus, while Bluetooth data are not generally considered personally
identifiable, they can be considered so based on the entity that owns that data;
and if so, it requires the same consent standards as GPS/CSLI data. Breyer
effectively subjects Bluetooth to the same consent requirements as CSLI,
meaning that under GDPR, contact tracing apps must follow the same consent
requirements regardless of which mechanism of location tracking they
follow. Even so, the principle of data minimization is also at play. The
European Data Protection Board (EPDB) has taken the position that contact
tracing apps require only deidentified proximity data and that the collection
of location tracking information violates the principle of data minimization
because “contact tracing apps do not require tracking the location of
individual users.”148 Thus, the EPDB’s view implies that the use of location
142

GDPR, supra note 23, arts. 4-6.
Case C-528/14, Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ECLI:EU:C:2016:779 ¶¶ 31-49
(Oct. 19, 2016), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=184668&
doclang=en.
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Bradford et al., supra note 83, at 6.
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A dynamic IP address is where the identifier assigned to a network-connected device
periodically changes, in order to protect the privacy of the end-user.
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Breyer, ECLI:EU:C:2016:779, ¶ 49.
147
Id.
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Eur. Data Prot. Bd., Guidelines 04/2020 on the use of location data and contract tracing
tools in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak 7 ¶ 27 (adopted Apr. 21, 2020),
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data is more violative of privacy than the use of Bluetooth data. Going further,
the Board requires that any unique and pseudonymous identifiers must be
renewed regularly.149
Here, the German app uses Bluetooth, rather than CSLI, to track
contacts.150 These data are encrypted using changing temporary keys through
the Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (DP-3T) and
Temporary Contact Numbers (TCN) protocol. 151 By using encryption and the
two protocols, the data being collected do not “reasonably” identify
individuals, thereby satisfying the CCPA threshold for using information that
cannot be linked to a user. In addition, every time the app exchanges data
with the server system, it processes access data, including the IP address and
the date and time of retrieval, although the IP address is conveyed only to a
special access server, which discards the IP address before forwarding the
data to the appropriate server.152 Even so, the app still asks for consent in
multiple places, satisfying CCPA’s and GDPR’s consent requirements. 153
In contrast, the Israeli app uses GPS (with opt-in consent to using
Bluetooth), for which CCPA requires consent. 154 But as we concluded above,
the app satisfies the CCPA consent requirements. Conversely, although
GDPR is technology agnostic, the Israeli app does not satisfy GDPR consent
standards given the principle of data minimization, and therefore would fail
the GDPR benchmark.
The North Dakotan apps are split: the Diary uses GPS data to track
location, which without consent would violate CCPA.155 Since the North
Dakotan Alert app uses Bluetooth to track contacts, it likely satisfies the
CCPA threshold even without asking for consent. While both apps
adequately fulfill both the CCPA and GDPR consent requirements, because
of the GDPR data minimization principle, the Alert app (which uses

Jelinek, Chair, Eur. Data Prot. Bd., to Olivier Micol, Head or Unit C.3 – Data Protection, DG
for Justice and Consumers 2 (Apr. 14, 2020), https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/
default/files/files/file1/edpbletterecadvisecodiv-appguidance_final.pdfour-work-tools/ourdocuments/letters/edpb-letter-concerning-european-commissions-draft-guidance-apps_en.
149
EDPB Guidance on Contact Tracing, supra note 148, at 9 ¶ 42.
150
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
151
Data Privacy and Security, CORONA-WARN-APP OPEN SOURCE PROJECT,
https://www.coronawarn.app/en/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2022); About This Project, CoronaWarn-App, GITHUB, https://github.com/corona-warn-app/cwa-documentation (last visited
Feb. 25, 2022).
152
Corona-Warn-App Privacy Notice, supra note 34, § 5(a).
153
Id. § 3(a).
154
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
155
See supra Sec. I.
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Bluetooth) satisfies both CCPA and GDPR requirements, whereas the Diary
app (which uses GPS) satisfies only the CCPA standard.
The analysis of the Indian app is similar to the analysis of HaMagen: since
it uses both GPS/CSLI and Bluetooth, without consent the app would violate
the CCPA standard.156 However, since the app does request consent
satisfactory to the CCPA standard, it passes the CCPA benchmark. In
contrast, because the app does not satisfy the GDPR consent requirements
and because the use of GPS/CSLI data violates the data minimization
principle, despite the technology agnostic nature of GDPR, the Indian app
fails that benchmark.
While CCPA distinguishes between CSLI and Bluetooth indirectly (by
virtue of identifiability), consent allows app developers to escape that
distinction, and any app that satisfies the consent requirement for collecting
data satisfies CCPA. Note, however, that app developers could escape the
need for consent under the CCPA standard if they used an adequately
encrypted or deidentified version of Bluetooth, which would make such an
app more usable. In contrast, prior to the guidelines for contact tracing apps,
GDPR did not provide this kind of flexibility regardless of technology. Since
Bluetooth-based contact tracing does not collect absolute location data and is
implicitly more privacy friendly than GPS/CSLI-based contact tracing,
CCPA’s approach promotes a more privacy-friendly technology, as do the
updated EPDB guidelines favoring Bluetooth rather than CSLI. However, the
European standard relies on the principle of data minimization rather than the
bedrock principle of requiring consent for identifiable information generally.
Table 4: Location Identifying Technologies Summary
Key: Green = Pass; Yellow = Unclear; Red = Fail; Gray = N/A
CCPA
Corona-Warn-App
HaMagen
Care-19 Diary
Care-19 Alert
Aarogya Setu
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D. Data Profiling
Data profiles compile or collate data from disparate sources in order to
identify individual users’ preferences, behaviors, attitudes, and
characteristics, and to predict future trends for consumer behaviors. In the
context of contact tracing, the creation of a data profile would require linking
the limited location and testing information gathered from an app with other
user/consumer preference data (such as purchasing data, demographic data,
and income and economic data) in order to build a stronger understanding of
each individual user. The creation and proliferation of such profiles creates
privacy concerns, both in terms of the breadth of knowledge that companies
have about consumers and in terms of the kinds of information that can be
deduced about a consumer by combining different types of information that
individually do not reveal much.157 Both GDPR and CCPA address the
creation of data profiles; HIPAA does not.
Under CCPA, personal information is defined in a broad manner that
implicates the creation of data profiles. Data collected for “short-term,
transient use” fall under the business purpose exception and are not subject
to the consent requirements mentioned above “provided that the personal
information . . . is not used to build a profile about a consumer.” 158 Contact
tracing data could easily fall under this exception. Additionally, CCPA
defines “personal information” to include information that could identify,
relate to, or describe “inferences drawn . . . to create a profile about a
consumer reflecting the consumer’s preferences, characteristics,
psychological trends, predispositions, behavior, attitudes, intelligence,
abilities, and aptitudes.”159 Thus, personal information collected using
contact tracing apps that helps identify consumer trends by adding to a preexisting data profile will be subject to CCPA regulations, such as notice and
consent, deletion, and access requirements.
Under GDPR, the data minimization principle applies: only data
pertaining to the purpose for which it is being processed can be collected. 160
157

For example, the knowledge about a consumer’s zip code or their birthday individually
may not be considered harmful. However, a collated data set that includes both zip codes and
birthdays of individuals significantly increases the probability that the consumer’s name and
identity can be determined. See, e.g., Latanya Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify
People Uniquely 2 (Carnegie Mellon Univ., Data Privacy Working Paper No. 3, 2000),
https://dataprivacylab.org/projects/identifiability/paper1.pdf (“[C]ombinations of few
characteristics often combine in populations to uniquely or nearly uniquely identify some
individuals.”).
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CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(d)(4) (2020).
159
Id. § 1798.140(o)(1)(K).
160
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In addition, GDPR has broad prohibitions on data profiling, and notes that
data subjects have the
right not to be subject to a decision . . . based solely on
automated processing . . . . Such processing includes
“profiling” that consists of any form of automated processing
of personal data evaluating the personal aspects relating to a
natural person, in particular to [analyze] or predict aspects
concerning the data subject’s . . . personal preferences or
interest . . . [behavior], location or movements . . . . 161
In contrast to CCPA, this means that the collection of broad personal data
unrelated to the original purpose of processing, collected in order to create a
data profile, is strongly discouraged and has no exemption for transient
purposes. Consumers can, however, opt-in to data profiling through consent;
nonetheless, the default is that data profiling is prohibited.162 However, in
some ways, GDPR’s standard is narrower—and thus easier to satisfy—than
the CCPA’s standard, because under GDPR, the collection of less related data
must be with the intent to predict or analyze behavior, whereas the CCPA’s
standard is that any data that allows for inference about consumer behavior
require the higher consent and affirmative user rights standards.
Of the five apps analyzed, the German, Israeli, and both North Dakotan
apps satisfy the CCPA and GDPR standards by not creating a consumer data
profile. The German app’s minimalist approach requires only consent for the
collection of Bluetooth data and the upload of daily keys and no other
personally identifiable information.163 Similarly, the Israeli app simply asks
for consent to use location data but does not ask for any personally identifying
information.164 The same is true for both North Dakotan apps. 165
The Indian app, in contrast, collects far more data about the individual
than the other four apps. First, as mentioned above, the app requires the
creation of a profile prior to its activation, including requesting a user’s phone
number and input about their travel, occupation, and certain health factors,
such as whether they smoke. Such information goes beyond the location data
collected in the other three apps. Occupational information and past travel
information can indicate information about the individual’s personal
characteristics and trends and could help link the data subject to a pre-existing
data profile, should the government (which owns the app) choose to create
161
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one. Because the app creates a data profile that satisfies CCPA’s notice
requirements but does not satisfy GDPR’s notice requirements, the app
passes the CCPA benchmark and fails the GDPR benchmark. 166
Thus, apps that require the bare minimum data (e.g. Bluetooth or
GPS/CSLI data) and do not require any personally identifiable information
easily satisfy the CCPA and GDPR benchmarks. Under CCPA, these apps
could also escape any consent requirement through the business purpose
exception, making the apps easier to use but also less transparent. The same
is not true for GDPR, where consent will always be required. Ultimately, both
regimes’ data profiling requirements can be satisfied by notice and consent,
which indicates that it may be fairly easy for app developers to use location
data to help build data profiles. The ease with which this standard can be
satisfied may reduce the public’s trust in contact tracing apps and thereby
reduce such programs’ efficacy. A data profiling threshold that is less reliant
on notice and consent may better influence the public’s decision to use
contact tracing apps.
Table 5: Data Profiling Summary
Key: Green = Pass; Yellow = Unclear; Red = Fail; Gray = N/A
CCPA

GDPR

Corona-Warn-App
HaMagen
Care-19 Diary
Care-19 Alert
Aarogya Setu
E. Data Minimization
Some privacy regimes require data minimization, which limits the
number of categories of data being collected by the app. HIPAA does not
have a data minimization principle. In contrast, CCPA permits the collection,
use, retention and sharing only of data that are “reasonably necessary and
proportionate to achieve the purposes for which the personal information was
collected or processed” and to other disclosed purposes compatible with those
purposes.167
Similarly, GDPR provides that data processors and controllers may
collect only the personal data only for specific purposes and may not process
166
167

See supra notes 116-120 and accompanying text.
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them further.168 Additionally, processing of personal data must have a lawful
basis for every controller, so that any additional data controllers must also
obtain consent from the data subject.169 These strong protections mean that
contact tracing apps must have strong justifications for each field of user data
being collected and cannot collect an overbroad range of data.
The results for all apps for data minimization are similar to, but slightly
different from, the results for data profiles. The German, Israeli, and North
Dakotan apps collect location or pairwise location data, as mentioned
previously, and link data subjects to test results. Thus, the two fields of data
necessary for contact tracing—location and test results—are the two data
fields being collected in these apps. Because only two data fields are required
for contact tracing services, the creation of an account in a contact tracing
app would violate CCPA's and GDPR’s data minimization requirements, in
addition to violating GDPR’s prohibition on data profiling. Note also that the
data minimization principle in the EPDB’s latest guidelines states that
Bluetooth data does not violate the data minimization principle, while
GPS/CSLI data does.170 Thus, as noted in Section II.C, HaMagen, Care19
Diary, and Aarogya Setu would fail the GDPR benchmark.
There are also instances in which an app can fail GDPR’s data
minimization requirements without creating a data profile. For example,
HaMagen may further violate GDPR’s data minimization requirement: it is
unclear whether it is necessary to collect motion data, which is used to
exclude location data where the user may be traveling in a car. 171 Similarly,
if the German app were to collect non-COVID-19-related health data, such
as sleep data, that would likely violate GDPR’s data minimization
requirement but satisfy the data profiling benchmark, but possibly satisfy
CCPA if sleep data are used for purposes compatible with contract tracing.
There are also instances in which an app can fail the data profiling
requirement, while succeeding on the data minimization requirement. For
example, the German app could simply link the contact tracing data to a
preexisting data profile while collecting no more information than required
for contact tracing, failing the data profile standard but succeeding on the data
minimization requirement.
This logic is also why the Indian app further fails in minimizing the data
categories being collected: as mentioned, it collects phone numbers, prior
health data, occupational, and travel data, all of which are not required for
contact tracing (as exemplified by the other three apps). However, it remains
168
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to be seen what the European Courts’ interpretations of strong justifications
are: would the Indian apps’ justifications for collecting non-location and test
result data fulfill the as-yet-undecided threshold for what justifications are
valid?
The data minimization benchmark creates an incentive for app developers
to create genuinely privacy-protective apps, in contrast to the data profiling
requirement, which is easily defeated by notice and consent. Note, however,
that the functionality of the app defines what “minimal” data are, and an app
that brands itself as more than just a contact tracing app—for example, an
app that also aims to prevent community spread—may be able to collect more
data than just the location and test result data for a simple contact tracing app.
Table 6: Data Minimization Summary
Key: Green = Pass; Yellow = Unclear; Red = Fail; Gray = N/A
GDPR
Corona-Warn-App
HaMagen
Care-19 Diary
Care-19 Alert
Aarogya Setu
F. Data Sale and Sharing with Non-Research Third Parties
Data sale and sharing refers to the transfer of data to third parties. The
former is done through the exchange of money, whereas the latter may be due
to existing partnerships, other business transactions, or business agreements.
Data sale and sharing enable the creation of data profiles that aggregate data
from different sources by entities outside of the app owner/creator. In this
section, we address data sale and sharing with non-research third parties.
Research exemptions are addressed in the next section.
HIPAA, CCPA, and GDPR all address data sale and sharing. HIPAA’s
restrictions on the sale and sharing of PHI require explicit consent with high
penalties associated with violations of this provision. HIPAA mandates that
covered entities and business associates not sell PHI, 172 unless the covered
entity tells the data subject that “the disclosure will result in remuneration”
and the data subject opts-in to authorize the sale of that data. 173 The
172
173
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regulations also lay out specific limits on what constitutes valid authorization,
creating a strict and well-defined bar for the sale of PHI. 174
CCPA’s requirements are weaker, mandating opt-out rights or consent for
the sale of any personal information.175 It also prohibits businesses from
retaliating against consumers who refuse to consent to the sale of their data.176
However, this prohibition does not apply to the sharing of data for business
purposes, such as short-term transient use of data or research for
technological development.177 It also does not apply to businesses handling
the personal information of fewer than 50,000 consumers and businesses
making less than $25 million in annual revenue. 178 Both exceptions mean that
the regulations around data sale and sharing are moderately restrictive and
that apps simply need to have an opt-out field to prevent the sale of their data.
GDPR requires controllers collecting personal data to inform the data
subject of any recipients of personal data.179 Controllers that do not obtain
personal data directly from the data subject must inform the original data
subject of any recipients of their personal data and any other envisaged
disclosures to other recipients.180 Data subjects have the right to receive
confirmation from the controller about whether it is processing any of their
personal data, information of any recipients of their personal data
(particularly those in third countries or international organizations), and
details of their rights under GDPR.181 Further, any processing by joint
controllers must be transparent. 182 Additionally, GDPR permits data transfers
to third countries (all countries outside the European Economic Area) subject
to a long list of requirements.183 Despite these standards, the regulation does
174
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not limit the kinds of information or the amount of information being shared
with a data processor. Thus, GDPR’s standards for how data are shared or
sold are ambiguous and have large carve-outs that make the regulation’s
protections moderately strong. However, since GDPR’s text governs both
data sale and sharing, it is more protective than the CCPA standard.
All of the apps we are studying can avoid HIPAA’s mandates by making
sure they fall outside the definition of a covered entity or by being designated
a hybrid entity. If HIPAA does apply, since all five apps eventually have
medical data provided to them (the German app requires reporting it through
a private testing facility, whereas the other four apps receive test results from
government entities), the analysis is easy. None of the apps indicate that they
are selling data or sharing medical data with third parties, which means that
all four would satisfy the HIPAA standard. Because no data are being sold,
the CCPA’s low benchmark would also be satisfied. Similarly, for GDPR,
while each of the apps does share data with third parties, each of the apps also
is performing a “task carried out in the public interest” 184—preventing the
spread of disease—so this data sharing is likely exempted. Even if the apps’
functionalities do not satisfy the “public interest” requirement, each of the
apps provides notice about the sharing of data for necessary purposes in their
privacy policies, satisfying the GDPR benchmark.
The German app’s privacy notice states that the app “will only pass on
your data collected in connection with your use of the app to third parties if
the [app operator] is legally obliged to do so,” indicating that any data—
including medical data—is [sic] not being sold or shared, which satisfies the
GDPR benchmark.185 Similarly, because the data are not being sold, it
satisfies both the HIPAA and CCPA benchmarks.
For the Israeli app, neither its terms of use nor its privacy policy explicitly
refers to the sale of data. The privacy policy states that “information about
your locations is only stored on your device and is not forwarded,” indicating
that the data are not being shared or sold, satisfying all three regimes. 186 The
only exception is verified users who consent to transferring their location to
the Ministry. Because the government is the app developer and not a third
party, no heightened privacy requirements exist. 187

does not include special categories of data specified in Article 9, and is unlikely to result in
a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons or is a public authority or body).
184
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The North Dakotan Care19 Diary app shares only anonymized location
data with third parties, and thus any such sharing complies with HIPAA. 188
The app’s privacy notice states that the app shares data with third parties such
as Foursquare, Google, and Bugfender “for specific data processing tasks.” 189
Because the data are shared and not sold, the CCPA benchmark is easily
satisfied. And because this information is shared only after obtaining notice
and consent, the GDPR benchmark is also easily satisfied.
The Care19 Alert app shares only anonymized location data with third
party processors, which generally falls outside of HIPAA’s scope. 190 Further,
the app’s privacy notice states that the app “uses Google Firebase Analytics
to collect usage data,” but that it “does not capture the Apple or Google
Advertiser Ids.”191 The lack of further representations about nondisclosure in
the privacy policy leaves it unclear whether Care19 Alert satisfies CCPA
(because of the lack of clarity) or GDPR (because of the inadequate detail in
the notice).
Finally, the Indian app notes that the data collected will “only be used by
the Government of India,” which is the app’s developer, so no third party
sharing is implicated.192 The app’s privacy policy also explicitly notes that
the data collected will not be used for purposes other than contact tracing and
will only be used by the app creator (the Indian government), implying that
health data will not be shared or sold to third parties.193 Effectively, the app
satisfies all three benchmarks.
Data sale and sharing effectively amounts to the transfer of usage and
location data from the original app owner to third parties, allowing thirdparties to use data for other purposes, including marketing, the building of
consumer profiles, behavioral analytics, and general consumer, market,
health, and location trends. The protections embodied in the three regimes
add caveats to the transfer of such data to third parties. Each of the three
188

Care19 Diary Privacy Policy, supra note 49.
Id. Note, however, that Foursquare is a “digital marketing service,” and it is unclear
whether the location data being shared with it is for the purpose of marketing or for other
reasons. Tim Starks, Early Covid-19 tracking apps easy prey for hackers, and it might get
worse before it gets better, POLITICO (July 6, 2020, 7:00 AM EDT)
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/06/coronavirus-tracking-app-hacking-348601.
Even if it were for marketing purposes—though the privacy policy, supra, denies that by
stating that “location data is private to you”—it is unclear whether the use of this data with
Foursquare would still qualify the North Dakotan app as under the public issue exemption.
Care19 Diary Privacy Policy, supra note 49.
190
Care19 Alert Privacy Policy, supra note 59.
191
Id.
192
Aarogya Setu Privacy Policy, supra note 68, § 2(a).
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Id. § 6.
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standards creates different incentives for app developers: the HIPAA
benchmark forbids the sale or sharing of medical data without opt-in consent;
the CCPA standard prohibits the sale of data but permits the sharing of data
for business purposes; and GDPR regulates the sharing of data but also allows
for public interest exceptions. The incentives created here are obvious:
medical data sharing is the most difficult and discouraged, whereas other
shared data are not covered even by notice and consent requirements under
CCPA, and data sharing for public health purposes is unlikely to be covered
either. Beyond the type of data, the sensitive information contained in contact
tracing apps can easily be sold or shared once a user gives consent or opts-in,
which many users agree to without reading the fine print. This reflects the
broader concern that the existence of information in this form could be shared
given the status quo consumer practices of the information economy, which
raises skepticism about contact tracing apps broadly.
Table 7: Data Sale and Sharing with Non-Research Third Parties Summary
Key: Green = Pass; Yellow = Unclear; Red = Fail; Gray = N/A
HIPAA

CCPA

GDPR

Corona-WarnApp
HaMagen
Care-19 Diary
Care-19 Alert
Aarogya Setu
G. Access to Data for Research
Researchers can access stored user data for myriad reasons. In the public
health context, both individual and aggregate data may be useful in tracking
down individual cases and in understanding broader geographic and
demographic trends in the spread of disease. In this context, we consider
whether researchers have access to (1) deidentified or pseudonymized data
and (2) individual user data. CCPA, HIPAA, and GDPR all address
researcher access to data.
HIPAA includes exemptions for research and public health. Covered
entities may disclose deidentified and limited datasets for the purpose of
research or public health, as long as there is “a data use agreement between
the covered entity and the limited data set recipient.”194 Covered entities may
194

45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(3)(i), (4) (2013).
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also use individual PHI for research, public health, health care operations, or
research purposes, subject to appropriate restrictions.195 Thus, HIPAA’s
regulations in this area are moderately strong, since they require
deidentification and limitations of the data being used.
CCPA also creates exemptions for research. For example, the obligation
to make certain disclosures for sales of personal information “for a business
purpose”196 does into include “internal research for technological
development and demonstration.”197 In addition, the statute does not require
businesses to comply with consumer’s requests to delete personal
information used for “public or peer-reviewed scientific, historical, or
statistical research in the public interest that adheres to all other applicable
ethics and privacy laws” if that deletion would impair the research and the
consumer has provided informed consent. 198 And researchers can access
deidentified or pseudonymized data. 199 CCPA’s definition of “research”
further requires that research uses be compatible with the business purpose
for which the personal information was collected, pseudonymized and
deidentified, made subject to technical safeguards and business processes that
protect against reidentification and inadvertent release of deidentified
information, and that such information not be used for any commercial
purpose.200
In addition, CCPA requires businesses to disclose the categories of third
parties to whom the business sells personal information201 and to obtain
notice and consent before doing so.202 “Third party” is broadly defined as a
person that is not directly collecting personal information from consumers or
is not receiving consumer data pursuant to a contract, 203 where “person” is
defined to include only private entities.204 “Sell” is defined as communicating
personal information for “monetary or other valuable consideration.” 205 In a
scenario where an app shares data with researchers for research, it is
ambiguous whether the business is receiving “monetary or other valuable
consideration,” and it may vary depending on whether the researching entity
is considered a third party or a business partner. For deidentified or
195

Id. § 164.512(b) & (i)(1) (2013).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.115(a)-(c) (2020).
197
Id. § 1798.140(d)(6).
198
Id. § 1798.105(d)(6).
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45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (a)(5)(ii)(B)(2)(i) & (ii) (2013).
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CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(s) (2020).
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Id. §§ 1798.110(a)(4), (c)(4), 1798.115(a)(2).
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Id. § 1798.120(a)-(c).
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Id. § 1798.140(w).
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Id. § 1798.140(n).
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Id. § 1798.140(t)(1).
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pseudonymized data, it is likely that such data is exempt, creating few or no
restrictions. For individual data such as PHI, it is possible that one of the
research exemptions apply, and that consent requirements do not, creating a
moderately strong restriction.
In contrast to CCPA, GDPR’s restrictions on research access are weak.
The regulation’s basic principles permit processing for “scientific or
historical research purposes” subject to appropriate safeguards, 206 such as
data minimization. Data minimization includes pseudonymization and
deidentification,207 where pseudonymization is defined processing data “in
such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific
data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such
information is kept separately and . . . [such] data are not attributed to an
identified or identifiable natural person.” 208 Member states may provide for
derogations of users’ rights to access data, rectify data, restrict processing of
data, and object to particular uses of data that may render impossible or
seriously impair the scientific research.209
A number of GDPR’s general provisions also have implications for
research. As a general matter, processing by third parties must be necessary
for the purpose of their legitimate interests except where those interests are
overridden by the data subject’s interests or fundamental rights and freedoms
of the data subject,210 where “third party” is defined to include public
authorities and agencies.211 One of GDPR’s recitals specifies that
“anonymous information, including for statistical or research purposes” does
not constitute personal data subject to GDPR’s restrictions. 212 To be
considered anonymous, the information cannot relate to a natural person,
which is a high threshold.213 GDPR also recognizes processing “necessary for
the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise
of official authority vested in the controller” as a lawful basis for processing
which does not need consent.214 Effectively, for deidentified data or
aggregate data, the consent and purpose limitation requirements are not likely
not to apply.
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GDPR, supra note 23, art. 5(1)(d)-(f).
Id. art. 89(1); see also id. recital 156 (describing safeguards of data minimization).
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Id. art. 4(5); see also id. recital 156 (noting the pseudonymization of personal data as a
safeguard).
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Id. art. 89(2).
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Id. art. 6(1)(f).
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Id. art. 4(10).
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GDPR, supra note 23, recital 26.
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214
Id. art. 6(1)(e).
207

2021]

PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF CONTACT TRACING

141

The research associated with the German app likely complies with all
three privacy regimes. The German app asks for consent to agree to share
usage data, which is information to improve the effectiveness of the app and
to improve statistics about the pandemic.215 If consent is given, usage data
are compiled into anonymized statistics.216 By requesting specific consent
before sharing usage data and protecting data through aggregation and
anonymization, the app satisfies the requirements of HIPAA, CCPA, and
GDPR. CCPA also specifically exempts research to improve the product.
A similar analysis applies to the Israeli, North Dakotan, and Indian apps:
Because no medical data are shared (including with researchers), each app
passes (or rather escapes) the HIPAA standard. Since the Israeli and Indian
apps do not sell or share any data with any third party, they also escape the
CCPA and GDPR standards. HaMagen does collect some information to
monitor and improve the app’s functionality, but the gathering of that
information falls within CCPA’s exception for research to improve the
technology, and the company also escapes CCPA and GDPR provisions by
collecting the data anonymously and (according to the privacy notice) and by
sharing only with the app developers. 217
Finally, the Care19 apps’ developers are not the states’ health
departments, who could be considered researchers. Nonetheless, location
data are shared—not sold—anonymously with state health departments, who
use such data to track the spread of COVID-19. For the Diary app, health
officials ask for consent to access recent locations.218 For the Alert app,
anonymized data about aggregate exposures is shared with the state’s
department of health.219 Because the health authorities are not paying for
access to this data, both apps likely satisfy the CCPA and GDPR standards.
Both Care19 apps also collect usage data on app crashes, diagnostic data for
reliability and support purposes, and general usage data, such as the screens
that are viewed most often and the adoption rate for new versions of the app,
all of which fall within the CCPA’s exception for research to improve the
technology.220
In the Indian app’s case, the data will “only be used by the Government
of India in anonymized, aggregated datasets for the purpose of generating
215

Corona-Warn-App Privacy Notice, supra note 34, § 6(f).
Id. § 5(e). The specific process used for anonymization is through rolling proximity
identifiers that change in short intervals. Additionally, the data are stored locally, so even the
anonymized data are not shared with a third party until necessary. See generally id.
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HaMagen Privacy Policy, supra note 41, § 13.
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Care19 Diary Privacy Policy, supra note 49.
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Care19 Alert Privacy Policy, supra note 59.
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reports, heat maps, and other statistical visualisations.”221 However, where
users test positive, the users’ data will be shared with “persons carrying out
medical and administrative interventions necessary.”222 Here, we assume that
the aforementioned persons are part of the Indian government, and thus not a
third party. If such persons are third parties, then further research is needed
into the relationship between those carrying out medical interventions and the
app developer, the Indian government.
The takeaway from this section is twofold: first, for contact tracing apps
and their background infrastructure, the three regimes provide large carveouts that mean that businesses conducting research (CCPA), covered entities
(HIPAA), and public agencies and other institutions (GDPR) can all
circumvent the consent, deletion, and accountability requirements that
otherwise would apply. However, it is easier for apps to share deidentified or
anonymized data, as compared to individual user data, which are still subject
to some regulations such as board approval (HIPAA), or ambiguous clauses
(CCPA). Second, where the research is being conducted by the app
developer—which can be a government agency with whom sharing PHI is
generally concerning, as with the Israeli and Indian apps’ cases—this
benchmark does not apply. Effectively, the regimes err towards public
interest and public health when it comes to research, and app developers
could easily provide pseudonymized or aggregated data to public health
entities without issues of liability.
Table 8: Researcher Access to Data Summary
Key: Green = Pass; Yellow = Unclear; Red = Fail; Gray = N/A
HIPAA

CCPA

GDPR

Corona-WarnApp
HaMagen
Care-19 Diary
Care-19 Alert
Aarogya Setu
H. Affirmative User Rights
User-controlled post-collection changes, or affirmative user rights,
include the rights to amend and delete data once they have been collected,
221
222

Aarogya Setu Privacy Policy, supra note 68, § 2(a).
Id.
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and the right to be forgotten. In contact tracing apps, these rights would
require apps to have the option to amend or delete collected data, either where
they are stored on the user’s phone, or on a centralized server. HIPAA,
CCPA, and GDPR all include these rights.
HIPAA provides subjects with the right to access223 and amend their
PHI.224 In practice, this means that PHI collected by a health provider and
transmitted to an app should be accessible and amendable by the users at the
point of input (i.e. the health clinic or health department). Because all five
apps are essentially reporting apps that are not the source of test data but
rather collect test data from third parties (health clinics or government
agencies), each app’s architecture allows it to escape the HIPAA benchmark.
Specifically, even if the app could amend the individual’s PHI in the app, the
original test result data reside outside the boundaries of the app, either on a
health provider’s database or a government database.225 Thus, since the apps
are separate from the entities that conduct testing and do not store the original
testing data, the HIPAA benchmark does not apply where the app is operated
or developed by an entity other than a test result provider or healthcare
provider.
CCPA requires the option for users to access 226 and delete their data at
the data subject’s request (though it provides no time frame for implementing
this right is provided).227 Notably, CCPA does not require the right to rectify
data.
In addition to the rights to access and rectification right mandated by
HIPAA and the rights to access and deletion required by CCPA, GDPR also
mandates storage limitation, the right to restrict automatic processing, the
right to data portability, and the right to object to automated individual
decisionmaking.228 Of the three privacy regimes, GDPR provides the most
complete list of affirmative user rights.

223

45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(1) (2014).
Id. § 164.526(a) (2001).
225
We note that both for HaMagen and Aarogya Setu, the agencies/government ministries
that collate data and conduct tests are separate from the organizations that are running the
apps, creating enough of a separation that the apps are not accessing test data that were
natively created on the app. Rather, a separate entity (a lab, hospital, or ministry-affiliated
organization) conducts the testing, and the app is simply a means of reporting that testing.
This two-step process means that the apps themselves escape HIPAA scrutiny. A canonical
example of where the app is subject to HIPAA scrutiny is if the app was run by a hospital,
clinic, or an organization that administered tests.
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CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100(d) (2018).
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Id. § 1798.105(a).
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GDPR, supra note 23, arts. 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21.
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With respect to affirmative user rights, the German app largely complies
with all three privacy regimes. If HIPAA were to apply, the Corona-WarnApp acknowledges users’ rights to access and amend their data. 229 The
German app allows users to delete contact journal entries “at any time.” 230
Positive lists, which have random IDs that indicate positive test results and
pairwise location data, are deleted from server systems within twenty-one
days.231 The app also allows users to delete contact journal entries containing
various types of information “at any time,” although data that has already
been transmitted to other smartphones cannot be deleted. 232 Users can also
delete the association of the random ID with their phone by deleting the app
from their phone.233 While this does not satisfy the “request” requirement
under CCPA, it still provides users with an option to delete their data, or have
them eventually be deleted, thus passing the CCPA and GDPR benchmarks
of right to deletion and erasure, although in a roundabout way. And as
required by GDPR, it acknowledges users’ key rights under GDPR 234 and
allows users to withdraw consent.235
The Israeli app satisfies CCPA by providing access and deletion options.
First, it allows users to look at exposure history in the app, satisfying the
access requirements.236 Further, users can delete the app, which would delete
all information on the device. 237 Deletion of the app does not have any impact
on information that verified COVID-19 patients have agreed to share with
the government, but that information has been anonymized and thus does not
fall under the scope of any of the three privacy regimes. HaMagen does not
appear to support the other user rights required by GDPR, including the right
to rectification, the right to restrict automatic processing, the right of data
portability, and the right to object to automated individual decisionmaking.
The North Dakotan apps also support a number of affirmative user rights.
The Diary app allows users to look at their location history.238 Users can
delete their data either by selecting the “erase data” button in the app or by
229

See Corona-Warn-App Privacy Notice, supra note 34, § 13 (acknowledging users’ right
to access under GDPR Article 15 and right to rectify under GDPR Article 16).
230
Id. §§ 3, 5(f), 6(b), 9(a), 12, 13.
231
Id. §§ 9(b), 13.
232
Id. §§ 3, 5(f), 9, 12, 13.
233
Id.
234
See id. § 13 (acknowledging users’ rights under GDPR Articles 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, and
21).
235
Id.
236
HaMagen App, supra note 105 (see “Exposure History” option under the main menu).
237
HaMagen Terms of Use, supra note 46.
238
Care19 Diary App, supra note 55 (see “Visits” screen); Care19 Diary Privacy Policy,
supra note 49.
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waiting fourteen days for the data to be deleted from the servers. 239 Users
may also use their “About” screen to see and delete all data collected through
the app.240 As such, the Diary app satisfies the right to access mandated by
all three regimes and the right to erasure required by CCPA and GDPR, but
not the right to rectify mandated by HIPAA and GDPR or the other user rights
mandated by GDPR. In contrast, the Care19 Alert app provides access to past
exposure checks but does not provide direct access to pairwise location
data,241 which is problematic under both CCPA and GDPR. Even so, users
remain free to delete the app and the accompanying data at any time. 242
Although the app does not provide a mechanism for deleting the information
that infected users have shared with others, that information has been
pseudonymized and thus is not covered by any of the three regimes. But like
HaMagen, the app does not support the other rights required by GDPR,
including the right to rectification, and so the North Dakotan apps fail the
GDPR benchmark.
Finally, the Indian app likely passes the CCPA standard. The app allows
users to “see recent contacts.”243 However, it is unclear how far the “recent
contacts” go, and whether users can see data from the beginning of collection.
Further, the app deletes all of the information provided by the user from
government servers within 30 days if users cancel their registration on the
app, satisfying both CCPA’s right to deletion and GDPR’s right to erasure. 244
The Indian app gives users “the right to access [their] profile at any time to
add, remove, or modify any registration information.”245 But the right to
rectify appears to apply only to registration and not to the other information
shared with the app, and the app does not support the other rights mandated
by GDPR, thus failing the GDPR benchmark.
The array of affirmative user rights is inconsistent across the three
regimes, with GDPR providing the most affirmative rights. As the most
privacy protective regime, each of the apps fails the GDPR’s benchmark of
the right to amend data. This creates a complex set of choices for app design.
Providing the option to amend location data is a complex endeavor, especially
239

Care19 Diary Privacy Policy, supra note 49.
FAQs About the Care19 Diary App, COVID-19 IN S.D. (2020), https://covid.sd.gov/
care19app.aspx.
241
Care19 Alert App, supra note 60 (see “Exposures” screen).
242
Press Release, Wyo. Gov. Mark Gordon, Wyoming Launches COVID-19 Exposure
Notification App with New Bluetooth Technology (Aug. 14, 2020), https://
governor.wyo.gov/media/news-releases/2020-news-releases/wyoming-launches-covid-19exposure-notification-app-with-new-bluetooth-tech.
243
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since the location data are not created by the user, but by phone hardware.
Further, amending such location data creates a means for users to change their
whereabouts, and make contact tracing less effective. Yet, GDPR clearly
requires this option, indicating that its set of affirmative rights may not be
right for public health-related issues.
Another design decision indirectly implicated by affirmative user rights
is how data are stored. Data collected by contact tracing apps can either be
stored on the user’s phone or transferred to a server in the cloud. If data are
retained on the user’s phone, the application architecture is likely
decentralized, with data being transferred to the cloud only for processing. If
data are stored on the cloud, the architecture is centralized, with data storage,
processing, and notifications all arising from the cloud. The centralized or
decentralized nature of the app’s architecture affects privacy, since data
stored on a user’s phone are either inaccessible or less accessible to third
parties compared to data stored on a server in the cloud. Here, the German
app is wholly decentralized, whereas the other four apps are centralized in
some way. The affirmative rights of access, deletion, and amendment are
easier in a decentralized system, since the data are on the phone and can be
deleted immediately; whereas deletion on a centralized server takes time
depending on whether the system processes data in real time or in batches,
and depends on the frequency and location of backups (among other
complications).246 Thus, CCPA’s deletion and access rights slightly favor a
decentralized system rather than a centralized one.
GDPR also creates the need for accountability mechanisms, which have
to do with the right to lodge complaints with a supervisory authority, the right
to seek remedies, receive compensation,247 and with the requirement for
controllers to maintain records of, inter alia, the purposes of processing,
descriptions of the data being processed, and the categories of recipients to
whom processed data are disclosed.248 This requirement creates the incentive
for a centralized system which more holistically and easily tracks the
creation, use, and removal of data. In short, the GDPR’s affirmative rights of
access, deletion, and amendment prefer a decentralized app architecture;

246

A real-time system is one in which data on the cloud are updated in real time once a user
makes a request. A batch system is one that stores requests and processes them periodically,
in order to improve efficiency and reduce the burden on the system and its connections to
different users. Laura Shiff, Real Time vs Batch Processing vs Stream Processing, BMC
MACHINE LEARNING & BIG DATA BLOG (May 13, 2020), https://www.bmc.com/blogs/batchprocessing-stream-processing-real-time/.
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whereas its provisions on accountability leans toward a centralized app
architecture.
These regimes thus create conflicting incentives for app developers.
Instinctively, decentralized apps are more privacy-friendly since data are
stored natively on the user’s phone. But accountability mechanisms might be
easier to implement in a centralized system, as would researcher access to
user data. This conflicting set of incentives means there is a clear trade-off
between privacy and statutory compliance.
Table 9: Affirmative User Rights Summary
Key: Green = Pass; Yellow = Unclear; Red = Fail; Gray = N/A
HIPAA

CCPA

GDPR

Corona-WarnApp
HaMagen
Care-19 Diary
Care-19 Alert
Aarogya Setu
I. Summary
The array of factors discussed provide a complex set of incentives and
pointers for app developers when designing contact tracing apps. Some of
these incentives are almost contradictory in the context of these apps. And
some privacy-focused requirements in the regimes under review are easily
defeated by others. For example, clearly worded notice and consent
provisions give users the ability to easily give blanket consent to the sharing
of their medical data, allow for data profiling, allow for additional data
categories to be collected, and allow for data to be shared with third parties.
These factors also implicate application architecture and test reporting.
The test reporting method affects what kinds of consent requirements and
exceptions surrounding medical data apply. Further, because Bluetooth is less
personally identifying than GPS/CSLI, it is preferable as a technology.
Because decentralized storage allows for easier implementation of the right
to access and delete data, it is the preferred system of storage. Finally, despite
the extensive privacy protections created by each of these benchmarks, the
nature of the actors also matters. If the app developer is the government, then
there is minimal protection against the government’s access of location and
testing data, despite such information not being shared with third parties.
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Finally, the regimes under review implicitly balance the need for privacy with
the need for researchers to access this data for public interest and public
health purposes. In the context of some public health crises, this might be
preferable. In the context of less serious crises, it may not. The balance is
subjective and provides flexibility at the cost of privacy.
Table 10: Summary Results
Key: Green = Pass; Yellow = Unclear; Red = Fail ; Gray = N/A
H = HIPAA; C = CCPA; G = GDPR
Notice and
Consent
H

C

G

Consent:
Medical Data

Location
Identifying
Technology

H/C

C

G

G

Data
Profiling
C

G

Data
Minimization
G

Data Sale and
Sharing
H

C

G

Researcher
Access
H

C

CoronaWarn-App
HaMagen
Care19
Diary
Care19 Alert
Aarogya
Setu

III.

THE IMPACT OF DISEASE VARIABLES

The framework developed above provides a method for assessing how
statutory privacy law influences different design decisions about contact
tracing apps created for the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the importance
and thresholds of each of these factors will vary based on the nature of the
disease. Diseases that are more transmissible, more dangerous, or transmitted
through different means may cause app developers and policy makers to
make different choices regarding the trade-off between privacy and
functionality.
In this section, we assess the robustness of our framework by analyzing
the impact of different disease variables on select factors. We assess three
different diseases, compared with the baseline of COVID-19: SARS, Ebola,
and HIV. We look at the mode of transmission, incubation period, mortality

G

Affirmative
Rights
H

C

G
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rate, and transmissibility or mean infection rate to see how these variables
affect privacy considerations.
A. Disease Parameters
COVID-19 is a viral disease that is transmitted through respiratory
droplets, and causes a variety of symptoms ranging from fevers to shortness
in breath.249 Symptoms can be felt anywhere from two to fourteen days after
exposure.250 The infection rate, defined as the number of people infected by
an infected person, was estimated to be between 1.5-3.5%. 251 While evolving,
at the time of writing, the pre-vaccination mortality rate from the disease was
around 2%.252
SARS is a viral disease, similar to COVID-19, caused by a SARSassociated coronavirus.253 It is also spread through respiratory droplets in the
air. A major SARS outbreak took place in 2003.254 The incubation period for
SARS is half that of COVID-19, at around two to seven days.255 However,
the mortality rate is significantly higher, at 9.6%, 256 while the mean infection
rate is around 3%.257
Ebola is a viral disease that causes fevers, internal bleeding, and death. 258
Major outbreaks of the disease have happened in 2021 and in 2014-16.259
Transmission happens through contact with an infected individual’s bodily
fluids, though individuals not in close contact (within three feet) of an
infected person are not at risk; individuals are not contagious until they begin
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Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Symptoms of Coronavirus (Feb. 22, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/symptoms-testing/symptoms.html.
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Coronavirus disease pandemic – Statistics & Facts, STATISTA (Mar. 1, 2021),
https://www.statista.com/topics/5994/the-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak/.
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SARS Basics Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/sars/about/fs-sars.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2021).
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Id.
255
Id.
256
Fatality rate of major virus outbreaks worldwide in the last 50 years as of 2020,
STATISTA, https://www .statista.com/statistics/1095129/worldwide-fatality-rate-of-majorvirus-outbreaks-in-the-last-50-years// (last visited Mar. 4, 2021).
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Infection rates of viruses involved in outbreaks worldwide as of 2020, STATISTA,
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Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Ebola Signs and Symptoms (Nov. 5, 2019),
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Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Ebola Outbreaks (Feb. 23, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/ vhf/ebola/outbreaks/index-2018.html.
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having symptoms.260 The virus can also survive on dry surfaces. 261 The
incubation period varies from two to twenty-one days,262 with a transmission
rate of 0.14-4.37% depending on the population.263 The disease is highly
fatal, with a mortality rate of 25-90% (though mortality varies by region). 264
Finally, HIV is an autoimmune disease that is transmitted sexually,
through the sharing of needles, syringes, or other drug injection equipment,
and through perinatal transmission.265 The time it takes for HIV to be
detectable after infection varies, from two weeks into the range of months. 266
The transmissibility of HIV depends on a variety of factors, is dependent on
case-by-case factors, and is difficult to measure given the intimate nature of
sexual activity and the lack of transparency and knowledge about partner
infection status.267 The range of infection rates, according to one study, could
be between 0.04% and 1.4% depending on the type of sex; this study does
not include transmission through needle sharing or perinatal transmission. 268
Mortality also varies depending on the geographic region, method of
transmission, race, and other factors.269 Current mortality rates in the U.S. are
around 4.7 deaths per 1,000 infections, though the rate was around 9.1 deaths
260

Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Ebola Transmission (Jan. 14, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/ vhf/ebola/transmission/index.html.
261
Id.
262
See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Ebola Signs and Symptoms, supra note 258.
263
Saranya A. Selvaraj et al., Infection Rates and Risk Factors for Infection Among Health
Workers During Ebola and Marburg Virus Outbreaks: A Systematic Review, 218 J.
INFECTIOUS DISEASES S679, S683 tbl.3 (2018).
264
Suresh Rewar & Dashrath Mirdha, Transmission of Ebola Virus Disease: An Overview,
80 ANNALS GLOBAL HEALTH 444, 444 (2014) (noting that case fatality rates vary from 4490%); WORLD HEALTH ORG., Ebola virus disease (Feb. 23, 2021),
https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/ebola-virus-disease (noting that case
fatality rates vary from 25-90%).
265
Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Ways HIV can be Transmitted (Nov. 3, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/basics/hiv-transmission/ways-people-get-hiv.html.
266
See, e.g., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, About HIV (Nov. 3, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/basics/whatishiv.html (citing the initial symptoms as being
experienced within two to four weeks); Philip Alcabes, Alvaro Muñoz, David Vlahov &
Gerald H. Friedland, Incubation Period of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 15
EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVS. 303, 303 (1993) (“[T]he lag period from infection to [detection]
is . . . 2 weeks to 3 month . . . and rarely lasts more than 7 months.”).
267
James Wilton, Risk of Exposure to HIV/AIDS, STAN. HEALTH CARE,
https://stanfordhealthcare.org/medical-conditions/sexual-and-reproductive-health/hiv-aids/
causes/risk-of-exposure.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2021).
268
Id.
269
See, e.g., Karin A. Bosh et al., Vital Signs: Deaths Among Persons with Diagnosed HIV
Infection, United States, 2010-2018, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1717, 1722
(2020) (“[D]ifferences still exist by gender, race/ethnicity, age, transmission category, and
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per 1,000 infections over the last ten years. 270 The historical peak of the
disease varies, and mortality rates depend on the kind of study; a study of
Israeli individuals infected with HIV found that 12% of infected patients died
in 1996.271
Table 11: Disease Variables
Disease
COVID-19
SARS
Ebola
HIV

Method of
Transmission
Airborne transmission
through respiratory
droplets
Airborne transmission
through respiratory
droplets
Contact with infected
bodily fluids
Sexually transmitted;
sharing of needles;
perinatal transmission

Incubation
Period

Infection Rate (%)

Mortality (%)

2-14 days

1.5-3.5

2.2

2-7 days

3

9.6

2-21 days

0.14-4.37

25-90

2 weeks to
7 months

0.04-1.4

0.47-0.91 (current)
12 (peak)

Note that SARS, Ebola, and HIV antedated the effective dates of both
GDPR and CCPA. Regarding HIPAA, the SARS outbreak occurred at the
same time that HHS issued the Privacy Rule implementing HIPAA. HHS
issued a bulletin in November 2014 providing guidance on its application to
Ebola but did not issue a statutory waiver. 272
B. SARS
The primary differences between COVID-19 and SARS are the
incubation period and the mortality rate. The reduced incubation period
increases the efficiency of contact tracing, since an individual will encounter
fewer contacts in a shorter incubation period, leading to fewer tertiary

270

Id. at 1719.
Zohar Mor, Rivka Sheffer & Daniel Chemtob, Causes of Death and Mortality Trends of
All Individuals Reported With HIV/AIDS in Israel, 1985-2010, 40 J. PUB. HEALTH 56, 56
(2018). Note that this is one study and one statistical analysis, and other studies have different
outcomes. We use this number simply for illustrative purposes, but acknowledge that the
mortality of HIV-infected individuals varies based on a multitude of factors.
272
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. Off. for Civ. Rts., Bulletin: HIPAA Privacy in
Emergency Situations (Nov. 2014), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/
hipaa/understanding/special/emergency/hipaa-privacy-emergency-situations.pdf.
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transmissions that need to be traced.273 However, the increased mortality rate
increases the need for contact tracing and researcher access so that public
health-focused groups can optimize their response and reduce the number of
deaths.
Here, the exemptions of the three regimes provide adequate flexibility for
responding to diseases like SARS that have more serious consequences and
may require more serious public health interventions. We note that similar to
COVID-19, it seems unlikely that individual PHI would be required in order
to track symptoms, since the disease’s mortality and transmissibility does not
depend on demographic or geographic factors (unlike Ebola or HIV). Thus,
we look to whether deidentified information is easily accessible by third
parties.
HIPAA permits the disclosure of deidentified and limited datasets for
public health purposes if a data use agreement is signed by the covered entity
and the recipient of the data.274 CCPA’s standard is less privacy protective,
exempting CCPA requirements for researchers accessing deidentified data,
and providing leeway to businesses helping with statistical research in the
public interest.275 And the GDPR standard is the least privacy protective here,
allowing for deidentified or aggregate data to be used for research if that is
compatible with the originally identified purpose of data collection. 276 GDPR
also has a public health exemption.277 All three of the standards provide
adequate flexibility to researchers to quickly tailor their public health
response when dealing with a deadly disease like SARS.
C. Ebola
COVID-19 and Ebola differ in three primary ways: Ebola is harder to
transmit, since it is not airborne and requires contact with an infected person’s
bodily fluids; Ebola’s incubation period is longer; and its mortality is an order
of magnitude higher.
The different mode of transmission means that contact tracing apps that
use pairwise contact tracing through Bluetooth may be ineffective, since
proximity to an infected individual is irrelevant to whether a user is infected.
273

See Matt J. Keeling, T. Deirdre Hollingsworth & Jonathan M. Read, Efficacy of Contact
Tracing for the Containment of the 2019 Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), 74 J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY & CMTY. HEALTH 861, 861 (2020) (“Longer time scales would allow tertiary
cases to be infected and potentially increase the scale of tracing required.”).
274
See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
275
See supra notes 168 & 198 and accompanying text.
276
We note here that there are implications to the strength and method of deidentification.
See supra notes 206-214 and accompanying text.
277
GDPR, supra note 23, art. 9(1) & (2)(c), (h), (i).
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Instead, location-based tracking may be effective in tracking the absolute
locations (rather than relative/pairwise locations) of individuals who
eventually test positive, and then informing others who have been in those
locations that they are at risk of having touched a bodily fluid. Pairwise
location tracking would be ineffective since proximity matters less than being
in the same physical location where an infected individual may have shared
bodily fluids. In fact, pairwise location tracking may overestimate
transmission and create false positives, since being near an infected
individual does not guarantee or even implicate transmission.
CCPA considers location data as personally identifiable, requiring notice
or consent.278 Similarly, GDPR considers location data as personally
identifiable, requiring notice and consent, limited processing, accuracy,
security, and deletion rights.279 However, GDPR provides app developers and
operators with a way to work around the consent requirement, since data
processing “necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public
interest” is alternative lawful basis for data processing. 280 While the other
requirements of limited processing, accuracy, security, and deletion might
still be required, the biggest hurdle of consent can be worked around. In
contrast, CCPA explicitly prevents the waiver of consumer’s rights under the
act, meaning that CCPA provides less flexibility in this context, and would
reduce the effectiveness of contact tracing by needing to ask users to consent
to the collection and sharing of their location data. 281
In addition to the impact on location identifying technology, the data
categories collected may be different in the case of a disease that spreads via
contact to bodily fluids. Because activities that involve the exchange of
bodily fluids include intimate activities, including sexual activities, an
effective contact tracing app may want to collect not just location data, but
also the relationship and identity of partners who are likely to have come into
contact with bodily fluids. The GDPR’s principles of data minimization could
be implicated in this process. Since GDPR allows only data necessary for the
specific purpose of processing to be collected, the app developer or operator
in this case would need to be able to justify why advanced partner tracking is
needed.282 Necessity also implies that a less privacy-intrusive mechanism for
collecting this data is unavailable, so the developer would need to eliminate
other, less-effective methods for collecting this data. And since the data
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See generally GDPR, supra note 23.
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minimization clause has no waiver or flexible interpretation, the benchmark
here is privacy-protective, but may hinder a public health response.
Note however that from a public health perspective, the long incubation
period may make contact tracing inadequate as a response. However, because
the mode of transmission is less dangerous than that of COVID-19 and other
airborne diseases, the disadvantage of the long incubation period on contact
tracing may be balanced by the fact that fluid transmission leads to fewer
potential tertiary transmissions. In addition, because individuals are not
contagious until symptoms develop, and because the symptoms of Ebola are
so severe and unique, as compared to those of COVID-19—which in mild
cases can be similar to the flu—contact tracing might still be effective in
identifying individuals who are infected, and finding tertiary transmissions.
Finally, researcher access, as discussed under SARS, supra, is also
implicated due to the high mortality of the disease.
D. HIV
COVID-19 and HIV are dissimilar in most ways, the most significant of
which is the method of transmission. In addition, the incubation period of
HIV is orders of magnitude longer than that of the other three diseases. These
disease variables implicate the following factors: location and data
minimization; consent for medical data; affirmative user rights; and
researcher access to data.
Similar to Ebola, because HIV is transmitted not through the air, but
through intimate activity like sexual activity and the sharing of needles,
Bluetooth pairwise data are entirely irrelevant. However, location data are
also irrelevant since being close to someone with HIV does not lead to an
infection. Instead, contact tracing in this case requires a log of sexual partners
or needles shared, and would be quite effective despite the long incubation
period.283 This is because the risk of tertiary transmission is lower due to the
method of transmission: since airborne viruses intuitively spread quicker than
viruses spread by direct or indirect sexual contact, it is less likely that HIV is
spread so quickly that contact tracing becomes ineffective. 284
Effective contact tracing thus requires tracking sexual partners, rather
than location, raising a vastly more intimate set of privacy concerns.
Informing at-risk third parties in the contact tracing process also implicates
283

Of course, location data may be helpful in tracing such partners, but would violate the
data minimization principle.
284
Specifically, the number of individuals exposed to an average COVID-19-infected
individual per unit of time is likely to be higher than the number of individuals exposed to
an average HIV-infected individual in that unit of time.
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the sharing of the data subject’s medical data with a third party. Here, HIPAA
requires explicit consent from the data subject for this data to be shared with
a non-research third party and imposes severe fines for violations of this
rule.285 However, if the President declares an emergency and the Secretary of
Health and Human Services declares a public health emergency, the
Secretary can waive fines where covered entities do not comply with the
patient’s right to request privacy restrictions and to receive adequate
notice.286 Thus, statutory issues around HIPAA provide some flexibility with
respect to notifying potential sexual partners of where the risk of HIV came
from. In contrast to HIPAA, GDPR provides inherent flexibility in the form
of a public health exemption that removes the need for consent for sharing
such data, without needing to rely on the declaration of a public health
emergency.287 Finally, CCPA does not have restrictions on data sharing, and
defers to the HIPAA standard regarding the disclosure of medical data.
Effectively, all three regimes provide varying levels of flexibility that would
improve the effectiveness of contact tracing, while reducing privacy for the
data subject.
In addition, affirmative user rights are implicated, much in the same way
that they are for the other apps. However, the privacy implications of an
incorrectly reported HIV test are significantly worse than those of an
incorrectly reported positive COVID-19 test, given the stigma associated
with being found HIV positive. Since none of the regimes provide for a
waiver for data correction and deletion, each of these regimes provides
minimal flexibility towards app developers developing an HIV contact
tracing app, which could hinder a quick public health response. 288 However,
this inflexibility works in favor of privacy rights.
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See supra notes 122-123, 172-174 and accompanying text.
See Project BioShield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (2004) (specifying
the authority of the Secretary of Health and Human Services in case of an emergency); 42
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Public Health Emergency (Mar. 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/hipaa-andcovid-19-limited-hipaa-waiver-bulletin-508.pdf (“[W]hile the HIPAA Privacy Rule is not
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Finally, researcher access, as discussed under SARS, supra, is also
implicated due to the high mortality of the disease.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Contact tracing poses difficult questions about how strike the appropriate
balance between the collective need for public health and the privacy interests
of particular individuals. This balance varies not only in terms of the severity
of the threat posed by different diseases, as discussed above, but also with the
importance of the privacy interests at stake.
These privacy interests can generally be divided into two categories. One
set of interests focuses on the rights individuals, either by creating a private
sphere in which they engage in self-development or by giving them control
over how their persona is presented to the outside world. 289 The other set
views privacy from a more consequentialist perspective that focuses on the
harms to society if privacy is not protected. 290
Different aspects of contact tracing implicate these interests in different
ways. On the one hand, location and disease information can raise direct
personal concerns both by allowing public intrusion into what would
otherwise be personal spaces and by preventing individuals from exercising
control over the information about themselves that is presented to the world.
The cost of insufficient privacy protection of these interests become manifest
in the form of stunted personal development and dignitary harms. From a
societal perspective, insufficient privacy protection can lead to lower levels
of contact tracing apps utilization and the concomitant harm to public health.
The nature of these different interests in turn shape the importance of
providing different types of data protection. Although the three regimes rely
primarily on consent and deidentification as the primary mechanisms for
protecting privacy, the differ in terms of their scope. HIPAA and CCPA
protect against disclosures only by covered entities and businesses,
respectively, in contrast to GDPR’s more general approach of encompassing
all controllers and processors of data. The distinctions drawn by HIPAA and
CCPA imply that disclosures by these actors pose greater harms than
disclosures by other actors. A comparison to the personal and societal

289

See, e.g., AURELIA TAMÒ-LARRIEUX, DESIGNING FOR PRIVACY AND ITS LEGAL
FRAMEWORK 28-32 (2018) (defining privacy by the control of individual information access
and dissemination restrictions).
290
See, e.g., id. at 33-38 (assessing privacy in terms of the harm brought about by information
leakage).
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interests in privacy would shed light on the propriety of this inference and the
particular interests each regime tends to protect.
GDPR also explicitly provides a higher level of protection to what it terms
special categories of personal data, including “data revealing racial or ethnic
origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union
membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the
purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or
data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation.” 291 HIPAA
similarly focuses exclusively on PHI. Both approaches contrast with CCPA’s
protection of all “personal information” largely without regard to specific
subject matter and reflect a recognition that not all types of personal
information have the same privacy implications. Moreover, all of the regimes
do not differentiate among different types of health information. In so doing,
they overlook the fact that certain types of health information carry greater
importance for privacy interests than others.
Lastly, GDPR provides the most capacious mechanisms for taking
privacy interests into account. The importance of societal interests are
reflected in its provision authorizing “processing . . . necessary for the
performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of
official authority” as an alternative to consent.292 It also permits the EU and
Member States to enact legislation to restrict user rights under GDPR:
when such a restriction represents the essence of the
fundamental rights and freedoms and is a necessary and
proportion measure in a democratic society to
safeguard . . . important objects of general public interest of
the Union or of a Member State, . . . including . . . public
health.293
At the same time, GDPR explicitly accommodates personal interests by
allowing justifications for processing to “overridden by the interests or
fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.” 294 HIPAA, in contrast,
is less flexible, providing only for waivers of specific rules during times of
national emergency. CCPA does not allow for waivers at all.
Thus, these regimes vary widely in the extent to which they can take
different types of privacy interests into account. We see how the regimes
emphasize different facets of privacy in how the different architectures and
design decisions of each app in theory succeed and fail benchmarks posed by
291
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each regime. In future crises, HIPAA’s strong blanket focus on PHI, the
CCPA’s emphasis on consumers’ privacy against business entities, and the
GDPR’s more all-encompassing approach will shape how app developers
choose technologies (Bluetooth or GPS/CSLI), application architecture
(centralized or decentralized), what kinds of data are collected, sold, and
shared, and how researchers interact with collected data.
In turn, these varying approaches to privacy will determine the
effectiveness of developers, technologists, and policymakers’ response to a
public health crisis. A heavy focus on privacy may impact flexibility,
resulting in a slower response. An overly flexible approach may give
governments and researchers access to sensitive data that can cause genuine
harm in the long term. No regime will have all the answers, and each will
leave open questions and uncertainty about aspects of contact tracing or other
public health responses that are unforeseeable, and each regime’s oversight
body will have to react appropriately. In conducting an analysis across
different privacy regimes, different contact tracing apps, and in looking at
different disease variables, we see how any technological response to a public
health crisis requires nuance and a struggle with the complex and fragmented
nature of statutory law. Our hope is that in future public health crises, as we
harness the power of the internet, smartphones, and ever advancing
technology, our lawmakers and privacy statutes take an interdisciplinary and
multifaceted approach to protecting privacy and promulgating the needs of
public health.

